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THE SHADOW OF FREE ENTERPRISE :
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION’S ADMINISTRATIVE
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Linda D. Jellum* and Moses M. Tincher**

ABSTRACT
Six years ago, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), for the first time giving
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the power to seek monetary penalties through its in-house adjudication. The SEC already had the
power to seek such penalties in federal court. With the Dodd-Frank Act,
the SEC’s enforcement division could now choose between an adjudication
before an SEC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or a civil action before an
Article III judge. With this new choice, litigants contended that the SEC
realized a significant home-court advantage. For example, the Wall Street
Journal alleged that in 2014, the SEC’s enforcement division prevailed in
100% of its administrative proceedings, while it prevailed in only 61% of
the cases it brought in federal court. While these statistics have recently
come under fire, it is no surprise that potential respondents to SEC enforcement actions who believed the statistics soon challenged the constitutionality of the SEC’s new choice.
In this Article, we explain why the SEC ALJs’ appointment and removal
processes violate the United States Constitution. The SEC ALJs are inferior officers of the United States. As such, they must be appointed by the
President, a court of law, or the head of a department. Instead, they are
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appointed by the head SEC ALJ. Additionally, in Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 1 the Supreme Court held
that dual for-cause removal provisions violate separation of powers because such clauses prevent the President from faithfully executing the law.
The SEC ALJs are subject to multiple for-cause removal protections. Possibly, the Supreme Court will refuse to extend its holding in Free Enterprise—that multiple levels of tenure protection violate separation of
powers—to ALJs. However, if the Court meant what it said and if the case
is to have any relevance beyond the agency involved in that case, then the
multiple for-cause removal provisions affecting the SEC ALJs specifically,
and all ALJs generally, will need to be reconsidered.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

N 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought a
record number of enforcement actions.2 The SEC’s new Chair, Mary
Jo White, credited changes in the agency’s approach for the uptick:

1. 561 U.S. 477, 483–84 (2010).
2. P.J. D’Annunzio, No Violation ‘Too Small’ as SEC Sets Enforcement Record, LAW
.COM (Oct.11, 2016), http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2016/10/11/no-violation-too-smallas-sec-sets-enforcement-record/?kw=No%20Violation%20Too%20Small%20as%20SEC
%20Sets%20Enforcement%20Record&et=editorial&bu=Daily%20Report&cn=20161013
&src=EMC-Email&pt=Morning%20News&slreturn=20160930151208 [https://perma.cc/M
V3J-ASZU] (noting that “[t]here were 868 enforcement actions this fiscal year compared
with 807 in 2015 and 755 in 2014”).
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“Over the last three years, we have changed the way we do business on
the enforcement front by using new data analytics to uncover fraud, enhancing our ability to litigate tough cases, and expanding the playbook
bringing novel and significant actions to better protect investors and our
markets.”3 Others credit White’s policy that “there’s no violation or potential violation that’s too small to go after,” for the increase.4 The truth
likely lies somewhere in between. Congress played a significant role in
the agency’s transformation. Six years ago, Congress enacted the DoddFrank Act,5 for the first time giving the SEC the power to seek monetary
penalties in its in-house adjudications. The SEC already had the power to
seek such penalties in federal court.6 With the Dodd-Frank Act, the
SEC’s enforcement division could choose which forum to use: an adjudication before an SEC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) or a civil action
before an Article III judge.7
With this new forum, the SEC soon realized it had a significant homecourt advantage. A recent Wall Street Journal study found that from October 2010 to March 2015, the SEC’s enforcement division prevailed in
86% of the proceedings it brought in-house, while it prevailed in 70% of
the cases it brought in federal court.8 Indeed, from October 2013 to January 2015, the SEC won 219 in-house adjudications in a row.9 In fiscal year
2014, the SEC’s enforcement division prevailed in 100% of its administrative proceedings, while it prevailed in only 61% of the cases it brought in
federal court.10 Perceiving these statistics to be accurate, it is no surprise
that potential respondents to SEC enforcement actions soon challenged
the constitutionality of the SEC’s new choice.11 Relatedly, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) was recently impacted by similar challenges.
On March 23, 2016, the House passed a bill that would strip the FTC’s
power to adjudicate antitrust cases through its administrative process following a court’s denial of an FTC preliminary injunction request.12 As3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376–2223 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.
tits. 7, 12, 15, 22, and 42).
6. See Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015).
7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1055(a)(1).
8. Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges Is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22,
2015, 9:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight-14482369
70 [https://perma.cc/2Y3H-8GV9].
9. Ryan Jones, The Fight over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use
of Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. Rev. 507, 509 (2015).
10. See Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Criticizes SEC Use of In-House Court for Fraud
Cases, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2014, 1:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/secfraud-rakoff-idUSL1N0SV2LN20141105 [https://perma.cc/L9DT-HUG2].
11. At least one academic believes that the SEC statistics are being used inaccurately
and that the SEC is no more likely to prevail before an ALJ than in court. See generally
Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2016).
12. Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2015,
H.R. 2745, 114th Cong. § 4 (2016).
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suming this bill becomes law, all antitrust cases will have to be brought in
federal court.
The first constitutional challenges plaintiffs filed in the SEC cases
raised equal protection and due process claims.13 In these challenges, the
plaintiffs alleged that the SEC’s administrative proceedings do not provide the same degree of procedural protections and fairness that are afforded in federal court.14 These challenges have so far proved
unsuccessful. Hence, a new round of challenges has now begun as a result
of the Supreme Court’s 2010 holding in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board.15 In Free Enterprise, the Court
held that dual for-cause removal provisions violate separation of powers
because the President is prevented from faithfully executing the law.16
The SEC ALJs are subject to multiple for-cause removal protections;
therefore, plaintiffs added Free Enterprise removal claims to their legal
challenges.17
The plaintiff in Bebo v. SEC was the first plaintiff to raise a removal
claim.18 On March 3, 2015, Laurie Bebo filed suit in the Eastern District
Court of Wisconsin, arguing, among other things, that the SEC ALJs’ removal structure violated separation of powers.19 The court in Bebo found
plaintiff’s claims to be “compelling and meritorious;” however, the court
held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear them.20 With this
ruling, the court effectively required the plaintiff to raise her claim before
the very tribunal she alleged was unconstitutional.21 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed.22
Several months later, the plaintiff in Tilton v. SEC filed a similar challenge in the Southern District Court of New York, alleging that the removal scheme for the SEC ALJs was unconstitutional.23 Plaintiff Tilton,
however, added a new constitutional claim: not only are SEC ALJs sub13. See Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Chau v. SEC, 72 F.
Supp. 3d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 514 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
14. See Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768; see also Chau, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417 at 420; Gupta, 796 F.
Supp. 2d at 507.
15. See generally 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
16. Id. at 496; cf. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d
1332–40 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that the Copyright Royalty Board members are similarly
unconstitutionally subject to dual for-cause removal protection).
17. See Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768; Chau, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 437; Gupta, 796 F. Supp. 2d at
514.
18. Bebo v. SEC, No. 15-C-3, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25660, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3,
2015).
19. Id. at *2–3.
20. Id. at *3–4 (concluding that the claims were “subject to the exclusive remedial
scheme set forth in the Securities Exchange Act”).
21. After Bebo was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500 (2016).
22. Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767.
23. Tilton v. SEC, No. 12-CV-2473, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 30, 2015), aff’d, 824 F.3dd 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2016). Tilton recently filed a new complaint with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Complaint at 1–2, Tilton v. SEC, No. 1:16-cv-07048 (S.D.N.Y.
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ject to unconstitutional removal provisions, they are inferior officers who
are not appointed by the SEC Commissioners, the President, or a court of
law.24 Thus, their appointment violates the Appointments Clause of the
United States Constitution.25 Just like the court in Bebo, the district court
in Tilton also dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.26
Shortly after Tilton was decided, two federal district courts rejected
both Tilton and Bebo’s holdings regarding subject matter jurisdiction.
The Southern District Court of New York and the Northern District
Court of Georgia both concluded that federal courts had jurisdiction to
hear these constitutional challenges.27 Because the plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions and declaratory relief, these courts next addressed
the likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims.28 In doing so, both courts addressed the appointment
claim, finding that because the SEC ALJs are inferior officers, and because they were not appointed as required, their appointment likely violates the Constitution.29 As for the removal claim, neither court believed
that multiple layers of for-cause removal protection were problematic.30
The plaintiffs lost these arguments on appeal.31 Collectively, these cases
raise difficult questions regarding the constitutionality of the SEC ALJs.
These cases could potentially dismantle the entire formal administrative
system.
Sept. 9, 2016). The complaint challenges the SEC’s decision not to apply its new procedural
rules in Tilton’s pending administrative case. Id. at 2.
24. Tilton, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015, at *5–6.
25. Id.
26. Id. at *36–37. (“Congress has carefully delineated the distinct roles of the Commission and the courts in cases such as this. It rests first with the Commission to determine
whether to commence an action at all . . . . [T]here is no basis to allow Plaintiffs to bypass
this congressionally created remedial scheme. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this action.”). The Second Circuit recently affirmed, over a strong dissent,
the district court’s decision that the case was impliedly precluded. Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d
276, 279 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that Congress implicitly precluded federal district court
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims).
27. See Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132082, at *20 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 1335,
1343, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and remanded, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th
Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1306, 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and
remanded, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d
382, 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
28. See Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *22; Gray, 166 F. Supp. at
1349–50; Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319; Duka, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 392–93.
29. Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Timbervest, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35; Gray, 166 F. Supp. at 1354; Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319.
30. See Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1319 n.12 (noting that the court “has serious doubts
that . . . ALJs likely occupy ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘adjudicatory’ positions, and thus these twolayer protections likely do not interfere with the President’s ability to perform his duties”);
Duka, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 395 (noting that the statutory restrictions on the removal of SEC
ALJs do not “infringe the President’s constitutional authority”).
31. Hill v. SEC, 825 F.2d 1236, 1237–38, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he district court[s]
[in Gray and Hill] erred in exercising jurisdiction. We vacate . . . and remand with instructions to dismiss each case for lack of jurisdiction.”). Duka was effectively abrogated by
Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2016).
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In this Article, we examine the validity of the claims that the SEC
ALJs’ appointment and removal process violates Article II of the United
States Constitution and the separation of powers principle.32 The importance of the resolution of these issues cannot be overstated. If the abovediscussed plaintiffs’ claims are valid, the SEC ALJ system will need to be
revised, and the legitimacy of hundreds of past, pending, and future SEC
adjudications will be in doubt. This concern may explain the SEC’s reluctance to correct the appointments issue with a relatively simple fix.33 In
addition, if the removal structure violates the Constitution, then the legitimacy of thousands of federal adjudications held before all ALJs may be
at risk because all federal ALJs are subject to at least dual for-cause removal protections.34 The appointment procedure used by other federal
agencies is less clear, but it is likely that the SEC is not alone in bypassing
the constitutionally valid appointment procedure.35
We proceed as follows: Part II explains the history of the SEC and its
expanding powers, and Part III describes ALJs generally and their role in
the SEC’s in-house adjudications. These parts provide background for the
remainder of the Article.
Part IV is the heart of the Article. In Subsection A, we first turn to the
question of whether SEC ALJs are inferior officers, because resolution of
the appointments and removal claims depends on a finding that the SEC
ALJs are inferior officers, not employees. Although the SEC claims its
ALJs are merely employees, we disagree. The SEC ALJs are inferior officers. Because the SEC ALJs are inferior officers, and because the SEC
admits that its ALJs are not appointed by its commissioners, the President, or a court of law, in Subsection B, we explain why the SEC ALJ
appointment process violates the Constitution. Resolving this legal question is easy; fixing the process is more difficult. Whether the SEC Commissioners can retroactively appoint its current ALJs without casting
doubt on existing decisions and pending cases is unclear. Indeed, the recent aftermath of NLRB v. Noel Canning suggests that these administrative decisions may be invalid.36 In any event, whether this type of post32. U.S. CONST. art. II.
33. Duka v. SEC, 15 Civ. 357 (RMB) (SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444, at *18 n.7
(The court gave the SEC the opportunity to cure any violation of the Appointments
Clause; however, the SEC advised the court that “[a]lthough the Commission in its adjudicatory capacity may decide in due course whether the SEC ALJs’ appointments violate the
Constitution[,] . . . the Commission has not issued a decision or otherwise taken any public
action on these questions.”).
34. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 478, 487
(2010). But see Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1349 (2012)(suggesting courts adopt a three tiered approach to for-cause
removal provisions to preserve both agency independence and the President’s removal
power).
35. Id. at 542–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“My research reflects that the Federal Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”);
see also John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 904, 904–05 (2009) (concluding that administrative patent judges are likely unconstitutional due to their method of appointment).
36. See 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2553–56 (2014).
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hoc “appointment” truly comports in spirit with the constitutional requirements of the Appointments Clause is uncertain.37
In Subsection C, we turn to the harder question: whether the multiple
for-cause removal provisions of the SEC ALJs violate separation of powers. After exploring the conflicting and confusing case law in this area,38
we offer a framework for determining when for-cause removal provisions
violate separation of powers. We then apply that framework to conclude
that the multiple for-cause removal provisions protecting the SEC ALJs
likely violate separation of powers. Specifically, the SEC ALJ’s first level
of for-cause removal protection is problematic under Morrison v. Olsen.39
And the SEC ALJ’s second level of for-cause removal protection is problematic under Free Enterprise. Because the second level for-cause removal provisions apply to most ALJs,40 the implications are potentially
staggering. And, again, there does not appear to be an easy fix.
Possibly, the Supreme Court will refuse to extend its holding in Free
Enterprise—that multiple levels of tenure protection violate separation of
powers—to ALJs.41 To extend the holding could significantly disrupt the
administrative state. However, if the Court meant what it said in Free
Enterprise, and if that case is to have any relevance beyond the agency
involved in it, then the multiple for-cause removal provisions affecting
the SEC ALJs specifically, and all ALJs generally, will need to be
reconsidered.
II. THE BIRTH OF THE SEC, ALJS, AND
SEC ADJUDICATIONS
A. THE BIRTH

OF THE

SEC

As a direct response to the Great Depression, Congress created the
SEC pursuant to Section 4 of the Exchange Act.42 The Exchange Act
authorized the SEC to enforce the federal securities laws by proposing
securities rules and regulations and by regulating the securities industry,
which includes the nation’s stock and options exchanges.43 According to
its current website, the SEC’s mission is to “protect investors;” “maintain
37. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power after Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1516 (2015) (suggesting that a workable account of the federal
appointments process requires blending both a formalist and functionalist legal analysis);
John M. Greabe, Noel Canning and Remedial Obligation Under the Constitution, 100 VA.
L.R. ONLINE 47 (2014) (arguing that the remedy for the wrong in Noel Canning should be
decided in a manner that is akin to harmless- and plain-error review).
38. Because most of the cases address the distinction between principal and inferior
officers and not inferior officers and employees, guidelines can be difficult to discern.
39. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
40. Whether Social Security ALJs are inferior officers is an open question given the
nature of their authority.
41. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 477.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012). The SEC also enforces the Securities Act of 1933, the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, and other statutes.
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fair, orderly, and efficient markets;” and “facilitate capital formation.”44
The SEC is an independent agency45 with five commissioners, all of
whom the President appoints, subject to Senate approval.46 No more than
three commissioners can be members of the same political party.47 The
Exchange Act does not expressly address the President’s power to remove the SEC commissioners.48 Hence, it is unclear whether the President has the power to remove them at will; however, many assume that
the President may remove the Commissioners only “for cause.”49
The SEC’s powers have increased with time and need. For example, in
1984, Congress granted the SEC the power to seek civil monetary penalties in district court in insider trading cases.50 In 1990, Congress, for the
first time, authorized the SEC to pursue any person for Exchange Act
violations through an administrative cease-and-desist adjudication.51
Prior to 1990, such actions had to be brought in federal district court.52
Through this in-house adjudication, the SEC enforcement division could
obtain an order enjoining anyone found to be violating the Exchange
Act.53 Congress also gave the SEC limited authority to seek civil monetary penalties in these enforcement adjudications against regulated entities.54 However, the SEC’s enforcement division had to file in federal
district court to seek monetary penalties against an entity who was either
not a regulated entity55 or was not associated with a regulated entity.56 In
federal court, the defendants could invoke their Seventh Amendment
44. The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, http://investor.gov/introduction-investing/
basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/S4UD-KB6H].
45. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 510–11 (noting that four Justices would find the
SEC to be an independent agency because it is a “free-standing, self-contained entity in the
Executive Branch”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz,
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
771 (2013) (noting that independent agencies are generally “defined as entities whose
heads enjoy (or are believed to enjoy) for-cause removal protection,” and they include the
“Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)”).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
47. § 78d(a).
48. In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission Act gave the President the power to
remove Federal Trade Commission commissioners for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office” (i.e., not “at will”). See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012).
49. The only time the Supreme Court has addressed this issue, the parties stipulated
that SEC Commissioners “cannot themselves be removed by the President except [for]
‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office’” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487
(citing Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)). The Court “decide[d] the case with that understanding.” Id.
50. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. Law No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264,
1264–65 (1984) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
51. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-429, §§ 102, 203, 104 Stat. 931, 933–35, 939–40 (1990).
52. See H.R. 975—Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act, of 1990: Summary Reported to House amended (07/23/1990), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
101st-congress/house-bill/975 [https://perma.cc/2D2A-2YPP] (This bill was not enacted).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2012).
54. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act § 203.
55. Registered entities primarily include broker-dealers and investment advisers. See
id. §§ 301, 401.
56. Id.
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right to a jury trial, file pretrial motions, and seek discovery,57 options
that are unavailable in the SEC’s in-house adjudications.58
Twenty years later, and in direct response to the financial crisis of 2009,
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which authorized the SEC to seek
civil monetary penalties from “any person” suspected of violating the Exchange Act—both those registered and unregistered with the SEC—after
an administrative hearing, subject to judicial review on the administrative
record in the court of appeals.59 Importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act gave
the SEC the discretion to decide whether to bring an enforcement action
in federal court or in an administrative proceeding.60 Because respondents in administrative proceedings have no right to a jury trial, no right
to file pretrial motions, and little right to obtain discovery, the level playing field tilted in the SEC’s favor.
B. THE BIRTH

OF

ALJS

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)61 authorizes agencies, including the SEC, to conduct formal, in-house administrative proceedings,
or adjudications, before an ALJ.62 When the APA was originally enacted,
ALJs were called “hearing examiners” because they were expected to
oversee hearings and compile the record for the agency to review de
novo.63 The name change is historically significant. At the beginning of
the nineteenth century, “examiners”64 presided over most agency proceedings.65 Agencies hired examiners directly.66 These examiners were
not independent, in the sense that the agencies for which they worked
controlled their assignments, their compensation, their promotions, and
their retention.67 Indeed, some examiners served completely at the plea57. FED. R. CIV. P. 12; FED. R. CIV. P. 26; FED. R. CIV. P. 38.
58. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.233–234 (2016).
59. Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act, amended Section 8A of the Securities Act,
Section 21B(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, Section 9(d)(1) of the Investment Company Act, and Section 203(i)(1) of the Investment Advisers Act to permit the imposition of
civil monetary penalties in administrative proceedings, in addition to the cease-and-desist
orders previously available to the SEC. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376, 1862–65 (2010). Additionally,
for cease-and-desist proceedings instituted under the Securities Act, where there was no
pre-existing provision for SEC-imposed penalties because that act did not address regulated entities, the Dodd-Frank Act adopts the three-tiered penalty grid already contained
in the Securities Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers
Act. Compare Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 929P with
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act §§ 202, 301, 401.
60. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u-1, 78u-2, 78u-3 (2012).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. (2012).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012) (authorizing agencies to conduct hearings before ALJs).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012).
64. The term “examiners” came into use in 1906. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.11, at 313 (2d ed. 1978).
65. Russell L. Weaver, Management of ALJ Offices in Executive Departments and
Agencies, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 303, 303 (1995).
66. Id.
67. See Malcolm Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States, 65
JUDICATURE 246, 246 (1981) (“The agencies controlled the compensation and job tenure of
their hearing officers and could ignore their decisions and enter de novo rulings instead.”).
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sure of their superiors and had no job security whatsoever.68 Hence, judicial “independence” and “impartiality” were not an assured part of the
administrative equation.69
By the 1930s, legal commentators began to raise serious concerns about
the status of these examiners as well as about the examiners’ ability to
decide cases fairly, independently, and impartially.70 For example, in
1934, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Special Committee on Administrative Law criticized the fact that some examiners exercised both
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions.71 However, separation of functions and status were not the only concerns. Even had examiners been
functionally separate from their agencies, their decisions were not final
68. See id.
69. See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953) (noting
that hearing examiners were “mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient to the
agency heads in making their proposed findings of fact and recommendations”).
70. An ABA Report concluded that:
[A]ppointments to administrative tribunals are all too generally classed as
patronage and, it is to be feared, the decisions of some of them are occasionally dealt with as a form of patronage. It is not easy to maintain judicial
independence or high standards of judicial conduct when a political sword of
Damocles continually threatens the judge’s source of livelihood. While a few
federal administrative tribunals have, in spite of all obstacles, preserved a
high degree of independence from political pressure and political considerations, unfortunately there are others which have yielded and as a result the
cause of justice has suffered.
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 57 ANNU. REP. A.B.A.
539, 546 (1934) [hereinafter ABA Special Report]; see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal
Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109,
111 (1981).
71. ABA Special Report, supra note 70, at 545. One member of the Committee
summed up the concerns as follows:
If there is anything of which we can be relatively sure after some hundreds,
even thousands, of years of experience with judicial machinery, it is that no
man can be trusted to be judge in his own case. And he is a judge in his own
case if he is also the prosecutor or if he is also the legislator who made the
rule he is asked to interpret and apply. Agency after agency in our federal
government is authorized to wield all three powers of government at once.
Wearing its legislative toga, a commission makes a regulation, on compliance
with which John Doe’s right to continue in business may depend. Having
reason to believe that John Doe is guilty of violating the regulation, the commission doffs the toga and, taking up the executive scepter, investigates and
prosecutes him. With the scepter still in its hand, the commission hurriedly
dons the judicial ermine and proceeds to present itself at least two scintillas
of evidence to prove that it was right in the first place. While care is sometimes taken to preserve the form of placing the burden of proof on the prosecutor, all the form in the world cannot disguise the fact that the burden is
usually on John Doe to prove himself innocent before a commission that at
least strongly suspects he is guilty. If John or his lawyer construes the regulation differently than does the commission, that is just unfortunate for John.
The commission made the regulation and is confident that it knows just what
it meant to say. And it is always free to change its mind. John is in the position of a man whose wife changes her system of bidding in the middle of a
bridge game without notice. He is sure to lose and is equally sure to get
blamed for it.
Louis G. Caldwell, A Federal Administrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 966, 973–74 (1936)
(emphasis in original). See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–38, 41–42
(1950).

2017]

Shadow of Free Enterprise

13

and could be overruled by agency superiors. 72
During the debate on enacting the APA, many suggestions were offered regarding how to reform the system. Some argued that Congress
should create a federal administrative court that would hear only administrative cases.73 Others suggested that Congress should create an independent administrative judiciary—a central panel of judges—to
adjudicate administrative matters.74 Congress ultimately rejected both of
these suggestions.75
In 1946, with the passage of the APA, Congress opted for a third approach, which included a number of protective components. First, Congress sought to prevent agency officials from acting as lawmaker,
investigator, prosecutor, and jury in the same case.76 To further this point,
the APA provided that ALJs could not be responsible to, or subject to
supervision by anyone performing investigative or prosecutorial functions
for an agency.77 The APA, thus, required an agency to separate its prosecuting functions from its adjudicating functions.78 Any agency employee
who investigated or prosecuted a case could not supervise or direct the
work of those individuals who adjudicated the same case.79 Additionally,
those individuals who investigated or prosecuted a case could not be part
of the decision-making process.80 And, the APA restricted some ex parte
communications.81 In short, the APA altered the prior practice to mirror
more closely the federal judicial process.
72. Lubbers, supra note 70, at 111 (“Furthermore, the role of the presiding officer in
an agency’s decisional process was often unclear; many agencies would ignore the officer’s
decisions without giving reasons, and enter their own de novo decisions.”).
73. John D. O’Reilly, Jr., The Federal Administrative Court Proposal: An Examination
of General Principles, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 365, 365–66 (1937); see also Attorney General’s
Committee on Administrative Procedure—Majority and Minority Reports, 27 A.B.A. J. 91,
93 (1941).
74. See generally Rich, supra note 67, 246–47 (describing these alternatives).
75. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2012).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2012).
77. See § 554(d)(2). Indeed, Congress created a unique system because of its concern
about separating the adjudicatory function from other conflicting agency functions. In 1970
and 1977 respectively, Congress created the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
(FMSHRC). Robin J. Arzt, Recommendations for a new Independent Adjudication Agency
to Make the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims, 23 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 267, 281 (2003). Both are independent, Executive Branch
agencies located outside the Department of Labor. Id. Importantly, they have adjudicative
authority only. Id. (“OSHRC determines whether regulations promulgated and enforced
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration have been violated. FMSHRC adjudicates violations of standards promulgated and enforced by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration.”).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
79. § 554(d).
80. § 554(d). There were, however, some exceptions. The APA provides that Section
554(d) “does not apply . . . to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising
the agency.” § 554(d)(2)(C). As a result, “a member or members of the body comprising
the agency” could be involved in prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions.
§ 554(d)(2)(c).
81. § 554(d). Congress later amended the APA to add another section designed to
address ex parte communications. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2012).
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In addition, the APA altered the prior treatment of examiners to more
closely mirror the status of Article III judges. The centerpiece of the APA
reform involved strengthening the job protections and status of some of
the examiners,82 or as they would soon be called, ALJs,83 by giving these
hearing examiners job protections designed to bolster their independence.84 So, the APA gave the role of hiring to the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM).85 The OPM was exclusively responsible for examining, certifying, and compensating these hearing examiners.86 The OPM
determined the minimum experience needed for an individual to be an
ALJ and evaluated applicants for the position (by conducting interviews,
by administering a test to evaluate writing ability, by evaluating the experience of applicants, and by ranking eligible applicants).87 Despite these
changes, however, agencies retained control over the ALJ they selected
from the OPM’s register and over the ALJ they hired.88 In other words,
while the agencies retained control over who worked for them, the pool
of available candidates, which the OPM now controlled, shrunk.
Once hired, ALJs enjoyed increased job protections and independence
vis-a-vis pre-APA examiners. Although the APA did not grant ALJs the
life tenure granted to Article III judges, the APA provided that ALJs
could be removed only for cause or due to a reduction in workforce.89 In
addition, the APA required that ALJs be assigned cases in rotation and
that ALJs not perform duties inconsistent with their role as ALJs.90 Additionally, the APA required that ALJ compensation be determined
based on length of service, rather than based on performance evalua82. William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing rights: An Unintended Combination,
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249 at 270 (2009) (citing KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
309 (1951)); ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, 77th
Cong., FINAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
45–46 (1941) (noting that the securing of fair and competent hearing personnel was viewed
as “the heart of formal administrative adjudication”).
83. Marvin H. Morse, The Administrative Law Judge: A New Direction for the Corps?,
30 FED. B. NEWS & J. 398, 401 n.2 (1983) (“The APA . . . initially referred to presiding
officers as examiners, colloquially referred to as hearing examiners. This title was administratively standardized to Administrative Law Judge by the Civil Service Commission in
August 1972. The ALJ title was ratified by the Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. [L. No.] 95-251,
92 Stat. 183.”); see also Paul R. Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary, 1992
A.C.U.S. 771, 798 (1992). In 1978, Congress amended the APA to officially change the
term from hearing examiners to administrative law judges. Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183,
183–84 (1978).
84. See also Rich, supra note 67, at 246 (“Congress, in its 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), sought to establish a corps of federal hearing officers that were more
independent of the agencies. Hearing officers were to be given career appointments and
compensation was to be managed by the Office of Personnel Management. Yet, the hearing officers were not granted complete independence from the agencies, for the APA allowed them to be assigned exclusively to particular agencies.”).
85. OPM has been “exclusively responsible for the initial examination, certification for
selection, and compensation of ALJs.” Lubbers, supra note 70, at 112.
86. Lubbers, supra note 70, at 112.
87. Lubbers, supra note 70, at 112.
88. Lubbers, supra note 70, at 113.
89. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.131 (2007).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.212 (2007).
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tions.91 As the Supreme Court later concluded, these changes made a significant difference in the status of ALJs:
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal hearing
examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is “functionally comparable” to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not
generally, comparable to those of a trial judge: He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing,
and make or recommend decisions. See § 556(c). More importantly,
the process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to
assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment
on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or
other officials within the agency.92
As others have pointed out,93 the APA system is hardly perfect. There
are criticisms of the OPM’s selection criteria and of agencies’ inability to
conduct performance evaluations.94 Indeed, ALJs are removable “only”
for “good cause,” which must be “established and determined” by the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) after a formal adjudication.95
Members of the MSPB, who determine whether “good cause” exists to
remove an ALJ, are themselves protected; the President may remove
them “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”96
Hence, all ALJs are protected by at least two dual for-cause layers.
C. SEC ADJUDICATIONS
Like other federal agencies, the SEC is required to appoint and compensate all of its officers, including ALJs.97 The SEC selects ALJs from
the OPM’s list of eligible candidates, based on the agency’s need.98 More
specifically, the SEC’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, with input
from the Chief Administrative Law Judge, human resources, and OPM,
identifies and selects SEC ALJs.99 The SEC Commissioners are not in91. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2012).
92. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
93. See generally Michael Asimow & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Merits of “Merits” Review: A Comparative Look at the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 28 WINDSOR
Y. B. ACCESS JUST. 261 (2010) (discussing improvements to the ALJ system).
94. See Verkuil, supra note 83, at 1011 n.1199 (noting that the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act “explicitly exempted ALJs from the performance appraisals required under that
system” to maintain “the present system of providing protection for [ALJs]”).
95. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b)(1) (2012).
98. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (2014).
99. See Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Demand for Jury Trial ¶ 52, Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2015)
(No. 1:15-cv-0492-AT), 2015 WL 4185313 [hereinafter Gray Complaint] (“SEC ALJs may
be appointed by the SEC’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief
Administrative Law Judge, human resource functions and the Office of Personnel Management.”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 930.204(a) (“An agency may appoint an individual to an administrative law judge position only with prior approval of OPM, except when it makes its
selection from the list of eligibles provided by OPM. An administrative law judge receives
a career appointment and is exempt from the probationary period requirements under part
315 of this chapter.”).
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volved in the appointment process in any way.100
By statute, the SEC may delegate adjudicatory functions to its ALJs.101
Pursuant to that statutory authority,102 the SEC, like many agencies, has
delegated significant authority to its ALJs to conduct administrative proceedings.103 Specifically, during these hearings, ALJs may:
100. A federal district judge enjoined the SEC from proceeding with an enforcement
hearing because the assigned ALJ was not appointed by the SEC Commissioners. Hill v.
SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1303, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (noting that “SEC ALJs are ‘not
appointed by the President, the Courts, or the [SEC] Commissioners’” and that “[t]he SEC
concede[d] that Plaintiff’s ALJ . . . was not appointed by an SEC Commissioner”).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012) (“[T]he [SEC] shall have the authority to delegate, by
published order or rule, any of its functions to a division of the Commission . . . including
functions with respect to hearing, determining, ordering, certifying, reporting, or otherwise
acting as to any work, business, or matter.”).
102. 17 C.F.R. § 200.14 (2016).
103. Under the SEC Rules of Practice, an SEC ALJ may, within his or her discretion,
perform the following actions: take testimony, 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (2016); conduct trials,
id.; rule on admissibility of evidence, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.111(c), 201.320 (2016); order production of evidence, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.230(a)(2), 201.232 (2016); issue orders, including showcause orders, see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. 201.141(b) (2016); China Everhealth Corp., 109 S.E.C.
Docket 2274, Release No. 1639 (July 22, 2014); rule on requests and motions, including
pre-trial motions for summary disposition, see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.250(b) (2016); grant
extensions of time, 17 C.F.R. § 201.161 (2016); dismiss for failure to meet deadlines, 17
C.F.R. § 201.155(a) (2016); reconsider decisions, 17 C.F.R. § 201.111(h); reopen any hearing prior to the filing of a decision, 17 C.F.R. § 201.111(j); amend the SEC’s OIP, 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.200(d)(2) (2016); impose sanctions on parties for contemptuous conduct, 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.180(a) (2016); reject filings that do not comply with the SEC’s Rules of Practice, 17
C.F.R. § 201.180(b); dismiss the case, decide a particular matter against a party, or prohibit
introduction of evidence when a person fails to make a required filing or cure a deficient
filing, 17 C.F.R. § 201.180(c); enter orders of default and rule on motions to set aside default, 17 C.F.R. § 201.155 (2016); consolidate proceedings, 17 C.F.R. § 201.201(a) (2016);
grant law enforcement agencies of the federal or state government leave to participate, 17
C.F.R. § 201.210(c)(3) (2016); regulate appearance of amici, 17 C.F.R. § 201.210(d); require amended answers to amended OIPs, 17 C.F.R. § 201.220(b) (2016); direct that answers to OIPs need not specifically admit or deny, or claim insufficient information to
respond to, each allegation in the OIP, 17 C.F.R. § 201.220(c); require the SEC to file a
more definite statement of specified matters of fact or law to be considered or determined,
17 C.F.R. § 201.220(d); grant or deny leave to amend an answer, 17 C.F.R. § 201.220(e);
direct the parties to meet for prehearing conferences and preside over such conferences as
the ALJ “deems appropriate,” 17 C.F.R. § 201.221(b) (2016); order any party to furnish
prehearing submissions, 17 C.F.R. § 201.222(a) (2016); issue subpoenas, 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.232 (2016); rule on applications to quash or modify subpoenas, 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.232(e); order depositions and act as the “deposition officer,” 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.233,
201.234 (2016); regulate the SEC’s use of investigatory subpoenas after the institution of
proceedings, 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(g) (2016); modify the Rules of Practice with regard to the
SEC’s document production obligations, 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(a)(1); require the SEC to
produce documents it has withheld, 17 C.F.R. § 201.230(c); disqualify himself or herself
from considering a particular matter, 17 C.F.R. § 201.112(a) (2016); order that scandalous
or impertinent matter be stricken from any brief or pleading, 17 C.F.R. § 201.152(f) (2016);
order that hearings be stayed while a motion is pending, 17 C.F.R. § 201.154(a) (2016); stay
proceedings “pending Commission consideration of offers of settlement,” 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.161(c)(2) (2016); modify the Rules of Practice as to participation of parties and amici,
17 C.F.R. § 201.210(f) (2016); allow the use of prior sworn statements for any reason and
limit or expand the parties’ intended use of the same, 17 C.F.R. § 201.235(a), (a)(5) (2016);
express views on offers of settlement, 17 C.F.R. § 201.240(c)(2) (2016); grant or deny leave
to move for summary disposition, 17 C.F.R. § 201.250(a) (2016); order that hearings not be
recorded or transcribed, 17 C.F.R. § 201.302(a) (2016); grant or deny the parties’ proposed
corrections to hearing transcript, 17 C.F.R. § 201.302(c); issue protective orders governing
confidentiality of documents, 17 C.F.R. § 201.322 (2016); take “official notice” of facts not
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(1) Administer oaths and affirmations; (2) Issue subpoenas; (3) Rule
on offers of proof; (4) Examine witnesses; (5) Regulate the course of
a hearing; (6) Hold pre-hearing conferences; (7) Rule upon motions;
and (8) Unless waived by the parties, prepare an initial decision containing the conclusions as to the factual and legal issues presented,
and issue an appropriate order.104
Although the APA requires that ALJs be assigned by rotation “so far
as is practicable,”105 SEC Rules provide that the Chief Administrative
Law Judge selects the ALJ for each hearing.106 The selected ALJ then
presides over the hearing and issues an initial decision.107
As noted earlier, procedures in SEC administrative proceedings vary
greatly from the procedures in federal court.108 For example, respondents
have no right to a jury trial.109 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Evidence do not apply; instead, the SEC uses its own Rules of Practice.110
Pursuant to these rules, respondents generally cannot take depositions or
appearing in the record, 17 C.F.R. § 201.323 (2016); regulate the scope of cross-examination, 17 C.F.R. § 201.326 (2016); and certify issues for interlocutory review and determine
whether proceedings should be stayed during pendency of review, 17 C.F.R. § 201.400(c),
(d) (2016).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (2016); see also 17 C.F.R. § 200.30–9 (2016) (authorizing
ALJs to make initial decisions). These statutes are similar to the authority in the APA. See
5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2012).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 201.110 (2016).
107. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(1) (2016).
108. David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1165–70
(2016) (discussing the ALJ process). Administrative proceedings in general differ in several critical ways from federal court proceedings. In the case of SEC proceedings, those
differences include: (1) In administrative proceedings, an SEC ALJ serves as finder of both
fact and of law; (2) Administrative proceedings do not afford juries to litigants, unlike
federal court; (3) The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which apply in federal court, do
not apply in an administrative proceeding; (4) The Federal Rules of Evidence, together
with their associated protections, which apply in federal court, do not apply in an administrative proceedings—any evidence that “can conceivably throw any light upon the controversy,” including unreliable hearsay testimony, “normally” will be admitted in an
administrative proceeding. In the Matter of Jay Alan Ochanpaugh, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 54363, 2006 SEC LEXIS 1926, at *23 n.29 (Aug. 25, 2006); (5) Defendants’ ability to conduct discovery is limited in administrative proceedings. For example,
pre-trial depositions are generally not allowed in administrative proceedings; they are allowed in federal court (17 C.F.R. §§ 201.233–201.234); (6) The SEC Rules of Practice do
not provide respondents the opportunity to challenge the SEC’s legal theories before trial
dispositive motions; dispositive motions are available in federal court; (7) The SEC Rules
of Practice do not allow respondents to assert counterclaims against the SEC. Federal court
defendants may assert counterclaims against their adversaries; (8) The SEC Rules of Practice require the hearing to take place, at most, approximately four months from the issuance of the SEC’s Order Instituting Proceedings (OIP). In its discretion, the SEC can
require the hearing to occur as early as one month after the OIP is issued. While the SEC
can allow itself years of investigation and research to prepare an administrative case, the
SEC does not need to start making available the limited discovery afforded to administrative proceeding respondents until seven days after the OIP is issued; and (9) Administrative proceedings are private, closed to the public and the news media, unlike federal court
proceedings. As noted, many of these differences apply in all administrative proceedings.
109. 17 C.F.R. § 201.110 (2016).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 201.100(a) (2016). Ochanpaugh, supra note 108, at *24 n.29 (“[Any]
evidence that ‘can conceivably throw any light upon the controversy,’ at hand should, normally be admitted.”) (quoting Jesse Rosenblum, 47 S.E.C. 1065, 1072 (1984)).
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obtain documents.111 Counterclaims are not permissible.112 And the
SEC’s rules do not allow for the equivalent of a Rule 12(b) motion to test
the sufficiency of the SEC’s allegations.113 Moreover, while the SEC may
on its own motion, or at the request of a party, order interlocutory review
during a proceeding, “[p]etitions by parties for interlocutory review are
disfavored.”114
SEC administrative proceedings also occur, in theory at least, much
more quickly than federal court actions. Following an Order Instituting
Proceeding’ s (OIP) issuance, a hearing must occur within four months;
however, the SEC may schedule the evidentiary hearing as early as one
month following the OIP’s issuance.115 At the conclusion of the hearing,
the ALJ issues an initial decision.116 Either the litigant or the SEC’s enforcement decision can appeal that decision.117 If neither party appeals,118 the ALJ’s decision is “deemed the action of the Commission,”119
and the SEC issues an order making the ALJ’s initial order final.120
If either party appeals, the SEC’s review is essentially de novo.121 If a
majority of the participating Commissioners do not agree with the ALJ’s
initial decision, the ALJ’s initial decision “shall be of no effect, and an
order will be issued in accordance with this result.”122 If, instead, a majority agree with the ALJ, the SEC will adopt the ALJ’s initial order as its
final order.123 An appealed ALJ decision is not final until the SEC adopts
it as final.124
If a respondent loses before the SEC, the respondent may petition the
111. 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.232–201.234 (2016). Recently, on July 13, the SEC amended its
Rule of Practice governing administrative proceedings. The most significant amendments
are that the length of the prehearing period is extended and parties now have the right to
limited discovery-type depositions in complex cases. Daniel V. Ward, Jon A. Daniels, &
Alexandria Perrin, Inside SEC’s New In-House Court Rules, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2016, 11:54
AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/823479/inside-sec-s-new-in-house-court-rules [https://
perma.cc/G6J6-XPBA]. The rules take effect for all cases filed after September 27, 2016.
112. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.100–201.250 (2016) (Rules of Practice).
113. § 201.220 (describing content of answers to allegations).
114. § 201.400(a).
115. § 201.360(a)(2).
116. § 201.360(a)(2).
117. § 201.410. In addition, the SEC can review the matter “on its own initiative.”
§ 201.411(c).
118. And the SEC does not review an initial order.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (2012).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2) (2016).
121. §§ 201.411(a), 201.452. Additionally, the Commissioners can allow the parties to
submit additional evidence. Id. While review is de novo, the SEC accepts the ALJ’s “credibility finding, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.” In re Clawson, Exchange
Act Release No. 48143, 2003 WL 21539920, at *2 (July 9, 2003); see also In re Pelosi, Securities Act Release No. 3805, 2014 WL 1247415, at *2 (Mar. 27, 2014) (“The Commission
gives considerable weight to the credibility determination of a law judge since it is based on
hearing the witnesses’ testimony and observing their demeanor. Such determinations can
be overcome only where the record contains substantial evidence for doing so.”) (footnote
and internal quotation marks omitted).
122. 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(f) (2016).
123. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012).
124. § 557(b).
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appropriate federal court of appeals to review the SEC’s final order.125
Once an appeal is filed, the court of appeals has “exclusive” jurisdiction
“to affirm or modify and enforce or to set aside the order in whole or in
part.”126 For judicial review, the SEC’s findings of facts are “conclusive”
“if supported by substantial evidence.”127
III. THE CONTROVERSY
Respondents raise two claims under Article II of the U.S. Constitution:
(1) the SEC ALJs’ appointment violates the Appointments Clause because the ALJs are not appointed by the President, a court of law, or a
department head; and (2) the SEC ALJs’ multiple for-cause tenure protection violates Article II and separation of powers128 because the President is not able to faithfully exercise the laws and remove incompetent
executive officials. Both of these claims require a court to first find that
the SEC ALJs are officers, not employees.129 If the SEC ALJs are merely
employees, neither their appointment nor their removal violates the
Constitution.
A. INFERIOR OFFICERS
The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution identifies the appointment procedure for two types of officers: principal officers, who are
selected by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and
inferior officers, whom “Congress may allow to be appointed by the President alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary.”130 No one
argues that the ALJs are principal officers;131 rather, the dispute is
whether the SEC ALJs are inferior officers or employees.132
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012).
126. § 78y(a)(3).
127. § 78y(a)(4). The court of appeals may also order additional evidence to be taken
before the SEC and remand the action for the SEC to conduct an additional hearing with
the new evidence. § 78y(a)(5). The SEC then files its new findings of facts based on the
additional evidence with the court of appeals which will be taken as conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence. Id.
128. Separation of powers is implied by “the opening sections of Articles I, II, and III
of the Constitution, [which] separately and respectively vest ‘all legislative Power’ in Congress, the ‘executive Power’ in the President, and the ‘judicial Power’ in the Supreme Court
(and such ‘inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish’). In
doing so, these provisions imply a structural separation-of-powers principle.” Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 515 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341–342 (2000)).
129. See, e.g., Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2015); Hill v.
SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
130. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
131. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997) (holding that military appellate judges are inferior officers, not principal officers).
132. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1316 (noting that “[t]he issue of whether the SEC ALJ is an
inferior officer or employee for purposes of the Appointments Clause depends on the authority he has in (“Whether administrative law judges are necessarily ‘Officers of the
United States’ is disputed.”).
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1. The Supreme Court’s Appointment Cases133
While there is no bright-line rule dividing principal and inferior officers,134 the difference between an officer and a non-officer employee
depends on whether the employee exercises significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.135 Initially, the Supreme Court divided government employees into two categories: principal officers and
inferior officers.136 The Supreme Court now recognizes a third category:
lesser functionaries, or employees.137 Employees do not exercise significant authority; officers do.138 When determining whether individuals exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,
courts consider a variety of factors, including the manner in which Congress created the position, the appointment process, the responsibilities of
the position, the tenure and duration of the position, the amount and
manner of pay, the level of supervision, and the identity of the supervisor.139 No one factor is determinative.140
Three cases are particularly illustrative. Two consider the status of
hearing officers similar to the SEC ALJs; however, the cases reached opposite and inconsistent results.141 The third directly addressed SEC
ALJs.142 First is the Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Freytag v. Commissioner.143 Second is the D.C. Circuit Court’s 2000 decision in Landry v.
FDIC.144 Third is the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Raymond J. Lucia
133. The Supreme Court case law in this area focuses on the difference between
principal and inferior officers, rather than the difference between inferior officers and
officers. This point makes the analysis difficult.
134. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to the General Counsels of the Executive Branch: Officers of the
United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause 3 (Apr. 16, 2007), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2007/04/31/appointmentsclausev10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RPQ-L463](“[T]he Supreme Court has not articulated the precise scope
and application of the [Inferior Officer] Clause’s requirements.”); Eric J. Konecke, The
Appointments Clause and Military Judges: Inferior Appointment to a Principal Office, 5
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 489, 492 (1995); John M. Burkoff, Appointment and Removal
Under the Federal Constitution: The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1335,
1347–64 (1976) (describing Supreme Court precedent as “circular” and “not particularly
useful”).
135. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662 (noting that exercising “significant authority” on behalf
of the United States is “the line between [an] officer and non-officer”).
136. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 235 (1839) (holding that a law clerk was an inferior
officer).
137. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
138. Id. at 881 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976)).
139. Id. at 880–82; see also Moses Tincher, Note, Timber! The SEC Falls Hard as the
Georgia District Court in Timbervest v. SEC Finds the Appointment of the SEC ALJs
“Likely Unconstitutional” 67 MERCER L. REV. 459, 468–70 (2016) (noting that courts use
the four-factors test in Morrison, as well as the level of supervision test in Edmond, to
determine whether an officer exercises significant authority).
140. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880–82.
141. See id. at 868; Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
142. Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g en
banc granted, judgment vacated (Feb. 16, 2017).
143. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 868–922.
144. 204 F.3d at 1134.
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Co., Inc. v. SEC.145
Freytag was decided first and is, arguably, the most important case because it came from the Supreme Court.146 In that case, the Supreme
Court determined that Tax Court special trial judges (STJ) were inferior
officers.147 The Tax Court is an Article I court with judges who are appointed for limited terms.148 Congress authorized the Chief Judge of the
Tax Court to appoint STJs to hear specific tax cases.149 For some of these
cases the STJ could resolve the case directly, but for other cases, the STJ
could only make recommended decisions.150 In the latter situation, a
judge from the Tax Court would review the STJ’s recommended decision
and make a final decision.151 Freytag’s case was one of the latter, requiring review and adoption by a Tax Court judge.152
Freytag challenged the validity of the judgment against him, arguing
that the appointment of the STJs by the chief judge of the Tax Court
violated the U.S. Federal Constitution’s Appointments Clause.153 The
government responded by arguing that the STJs were merely employees
who did “no more than assist the regular Tax Court judge in taking the
evidence and preparing proposed findings and opinion.”154 The Justices
unanimously rejected this argument and held that the STJs were inferior
officers.155 To hold that the STJs were inferior officers and not merely
employees, the Court considered several factors. First, the Court noted
that “the office of a special trial judge is ‘established by Law’”156 and that
the statute lays out the “duties, salary, and means of appointment for that
office.”157 The Court noted that “[t]hese characteristics distinguish special trial judges from special masters, who are hired by Article III courts
on a temporary, episodic basis, whose positions are not established by
law, and whose duties and functions are not delineated in a statute.”158 In
other words, STJs serve more permanently.
145. 832 F.3d at 296 (reh’g granted Feb. 16, 2017).
146. 501 U.S. at 868.
147. Id. at 881–82.
148. Id. at 871.
149. Id. at 870.
150. Id. at 873.
151. Id. at 873.
152. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 872.
153. Id. at 872.
154. Id. at 880.
155. The Justices sharply disagreed as to why the appointment process was valid. See id.
Five justices reasoned that the STJ was an “inferior Officer” whose appointment was
proper because the Tax Court could properly appoint an inferior officer as one of “the
Courts of Law” under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. Id. at 890–92. The remaining four
justices reasoned that the STJ was an “inferior Officer,” but that the Tax Court’s power to
make such appoints derived from the fact that it was a Department within the meaning of
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. Id. at 892–93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 881 (citing Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516–17 (1920)); United
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879)).
157. Id. at 880–82 (citing Burnap, 252 U.S. at 516-17; Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–512.)
158. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
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Second, the Court focused on the types of duties and level of discretion
the STJs had. The STJs “perform more than ministerial tasks. They take
testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have
the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.”159 In the course
of performing these tasks, the STJs “exercise significant discretion.”160
Third, the Court added that “[e]ven if the duties of [STJs] were not as
significant as we . . . have found them to be,” there are circumstances
where they “exercise independent authority,” and they cannot be “inferior officers” for some purposes and not others.161 Fourth, and almost as
an aside, the Court pointed out that the STJs were authorized to decide
cases in some instances, even if in other instances the STJs only proposed
findings and orders, while the regular Tax Court judge rendered the final
decision.162 Notably, the Court specifically rejected the argument that officials who “lack authority to enter into a final decision” must be employees and not inferior officers, because that argument “ignores the
significance of the duties and discretion that special trial judges possess.”163 In sum, the Court held that the STJs could not be inferior officers in some situations and employees in others, finding that the STJs’
limited, final decision-making authority was not determinative.164
Despite this relatively clear finding, the D.C. Circuit Court in Landry v.
FDIC focused on this factor to distinguish Freytag’s holding from the case
that came before that court.165 In Landry, the D.C. Circuit Court held
that Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) ALJs were employees and not inferior officers.166 The plaintiff in Landry challenged the
constitutionality of the FDIC ALJ appointment process.167 Landry argued that the FDIC ALJ was an inferior officer who could only be appointed by the President, the courts, or the head of a department
pursuant to the Appointments Clause.168 The FDIC ALJ had been appointed by a federal banking agency.169
In resolving the inferior officer issue, the court noted that “[t]he line
between ‘mere’ employees and inferior officers is anything but bright. . . .
In fact, the earliest Appointments Clause cases often employed circular
logic, granting officer status to an official based in part upon his appoint159. Id. at 881–82.
160. Id. at 882
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 881.
164. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.
165. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1125–44 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
166. Id. at 1134.
167. Id. at 1130.
168. “[The President] . . . shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
169. Landry, 204. F.3d at 1130.
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ment by the head of a department.”170 Next, the court examined and distinguished Freytag, claiming, erroneously, that the Court in that case had
“laid exceptional stress on the STJs’ final decision[-]making power.”171
The Landry majority noted that the STJs had “authority to render the
final decision of the Tax Court in declaratory judgment proceedings and
in certain small-amount tax cases.”172 The majority contrasted the FDIC
ALJs’ decision-making authority with that of the STJs, noting that the
FDIC ALJs issue recommended, not initial, decisions.173 The FDIC
Board of Directors then renders a final decision based on a de novo review of the entire record.174 Because the FDIC ALJs could only issue
recommended decisions, and because final decisions were reserved to the
FDIC, the majority held that the FDIC ALJs were employees, not
officers.175
Judge Randolph concurred in the result, but strongly criticized the majority’s finding that the FDIC ALJs were not inferior officers.176 He reasoned that the FDIC ALJs were indistinguishable from the STJs based on
the reasoning provided in Freytag.177 Quoting Freytag extensively, Judge
Randolph noted that the Supreme Court had placed no particular emphasis on the fact that the STJs had final decision-making authority.178 Indeed, “the fact that an ALJ cannot render a final decision and is subject
to the ultimate supervision of the FDIC shows only that the ALJ shares
the common characteristic of the ‘inferior Officer,’ [because] ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by
others who were appointed by Presidential nomination.”179 Judge Randolph also pointed out that the decisive fact for the majority in Landry—
that the FDIC ALJs lack authority to enter final orders—was based on
an “alternative holding” from Freytag; the Supreme Court had already
determined the STJs were inferior officers before it provided the finalorder-authority analysis.180
In short, Landry’s holding that the FDIC ALJs were not officers is in170. Id. at 1132 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 1134.
172. Id. at 1133 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882) (emphasis in original).
173. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 308.38).
174. Id. (citing 12 C.F.R. § 308.40).
175. Landry, 204. F.3d at 1133.
176. Id. at 1140 (Randolph, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 1140–41 (finding that Freytag “cannot be distinguished” because “[t]here are
no relevant differences between the ALJ in this case and the [STJ] in Freytag”) (emphasis
in original).
178. Id. at 1142 (noting that the majority’s “first distinction of Freytag is thus no distinction at all”) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court stated that Tax Court Rule 183,
which established the deferential standard, was “not relevant to [its] grant of certiorari,”
and noted that it would say no more about the rule than to say that the STJ did not have
final authority to decide Petitioner’s case. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 874 n.3 (1991);
see also Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (Randolph, J., concurring).
179. Landry, 204. F.3d at 1142 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663
(1997)).
180. Id. Despite finding that FDIC ALJs are inferior officers, Judge Randolph also
noted there was no violation of the Appointments Clause because (1) the FDIC ALJs were
properly appointed by the Office of Thrift Supervision—which may constitute the “head of
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consistent with Freytag and other cases addressing this issue.181 The Landry majority acknowledged that the FDIC ALJs, like the STJs, were
established by law; that their “duties, salary, and means of appointment”
were specified by statute; and that they conduct trials, take testimony,
rule on evidence admissibility, and enforce discovery compliance.182 Even
though the Supreme Court in Freytag found that the STJs’ exercise of
these powers constituted the exercise of “significant authority,” the Landry majority concluded the FDIC ALJs’ exercise of these powers was less
important than whether the ALJs had the authority to render a final decision.183 Despite recognizing that the Supreme Court had “introduced
mention of the STJs’ power to render final decisions with something of a
shrug,” the D.C. Circuit held that FDIC ALJs were not inferior officers
solely because they did not have the power to render final decisions in
certain cases.184
More recently, the D.C. Circuit compounded its error and gave employer-agencies the power to determine whether its ALJ were employees
or inferior officers. In Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC,185—the first of
these SEC cases to reach the courts—the D.C. Circuit identified the
“main criteria for drawing the line between inferior Officers and employees . . . [as] (1) the significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2)
the discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality
of those decisions.”186 The court repeated that the FDIC ALJs in Landry
were not inferior officers because they did not meet the third criterion.187
The court then reasoned that its holding in Landry required it to hold
that the SEC ALJs are employees because they too, it concluded, cannot
issue final decisions.188 This holding is incorrect because, as shown above,
this reasoning is inconsistent with Freytag; yet, the court suggested that it
was bound to follow its precedent regardless of whether Landry and
Freytag were consistent.189
department” under Article II, and (2) because of the FDIC’s de novo review process, the
plaintiff had suffered no prejudice. Id. at 1143.
181. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 665–66 (1997) (examining a number of factors to hold that judges of Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals were inferior
officers); Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 187–88 (1995) (examining a number of
factors to hold that appellate military judges from the Coast Guard Court of Military Review were inferior officers subject to the appointment provisions).
182. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133–34 (internal quotations omitted).
183. Id. at 1133.
184. Id. at 1134; cf. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d
1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (reasoning that the Copyright Royalty Board’s
“nonremovability and the finality of its decision[-making] made the officers inferior
officers”).
185. See generally 832 F.3d 277, 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reh’g granted Feb. 16, 2017).
186. Id. at 284 (quoting Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 285.
189. Id. (arguing that “to the extent petitioners contend that the approach required by
Landry is inconsistent with Freytag or other Supreme Court precedent, this court has rejected that argument and Landry is the law of the circuit”).
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However, even if the court is correct that the finality of the decisionmaking authority is the only relevant criterion, this decision is wrong for
another reason. As the petitioners argued, the relevant statute specifically
provides that an SEC ALJ’s decision “shall, for all purposes, including
appeal or review thereof, be deemed the action of the Commission.”190
Thus, the statutory language provides that the SEC ALJs have statutory
authority to make final decisions. In other words, Congress authorized
the SEC ALJs to have final decision-making authority, and it is congressional intent regarding the status of these officers that is relevant.
In Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc., the government acknowledged that the
statute authorized the SEC ALJs to make final decisions; however, the
government countered that the SEC, by rule, chose not to give ALJs this
finality decision-making power.191 The D.C. Circuit adopted this argument noting that, first, the SEC’s rules provide that the SEC can take
additional time to decide whether it will review an ALJ decision, even
when no one requests such review.192 Second, the SEC’s rules provide
that when deciding not to order review, the Commission will issue an
order indicating that it has decided not to review the ALJ’s decision and
set a date when any sanctions will take effect.193 Yet, it is unclear how
either of these actions alone, or combined, robs the ALJ’s decision of
finality. Regardless, even if they did, these are the SEC’s rules, not congressional statutes.194 The SEC simply has no power to turn an inferior
officer into an employee by issuing a procedural rule or two.195 The decision of whether an officer is a principal officer, an inferior officer, or an
employee was constitutionally left to Congress, not the agency employing
that officer.196 The D.C. Circuit flipped the power.
In sum, the D.C. Circuit in both Landry and Raymond J. Lucia Co.,
Inc. misapplied Freytag by concluding that final decision-making authority was the sole criterion for distinguishing between an inferior officer
and an employee.197 The court’s holding in both cases is not consistent
with Freytag. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit compounded its erroneous reasoning. Even if the court were correct that final decision-making authority alone were the deciding factor, Congress gave such authority to the
SEC ALJs.198 It is immaterial that the SEC may have tried to cabin that
authority by issuing procedural rules; the SEC simply has no power to
190. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (2012).
191. 832 F.3d at 285–86.
192. Id. at 286 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(c)).
193. Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2)).
194. See generally 17 C.F.R. §201.100.
195. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001) (rejecting the lower
court’s holding that an agency could cure a delegation issue by narrowly interpreting its
governing statute).
196. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
197. See Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284–85 (D.C. Cir. 2016),
reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated (Feb. 16, 2017) (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d
1125, 1134–35 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
198. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c).
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determine what type of officer it hires. In short, these decisions should
not control the outcome of whether the SEC ALJs are inferior officers.
In late 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
decided Bandimere v. SEC.199 Bandimere involved an appeal from an
SEC administrative enforcement proceeding presided over by an SEC
ALJ. The plaintiff in the case argued in the underlying enforcement proceeding that the SEC ALJ was an inferior officer and unconstitutionally
appointed; however, the SEC rejected that argument.200 The SEC conceded that if the SEC ALJ were an inferior officer, he would be unconstitutionally appointed.201 However, the SEC argued that its SEC ALJs are
merely employees, not inferior officers.202
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the SEC and held that
because the SEC ALJ was an inferior officer who was not appointed as
the Constitution required, he “held his office unconstitutionally when he
presided over Mr. Bandimere’s hearing.”203 In its reasoning, the majority
explained that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court has not stated a specific
test for determining whether an employee has inferior officer status,
‘[e]fforts to define [‘inferior Officers’] inevitably conclude that the term’s
sweep is unusually broad.’”204
Importantly, the majority noted that the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Freytag v. Commissioner205 controlled the result in Bandimere.206 In
Freytag, a unanimous Court had held that the Tax Court’s special trial
judges (STJs) were inferior officers and not employees.207 As noted
above, the Court identified three factors for courts to consider when determining whether an employee is an inferior officer: First, whether the
position was “established by law;” second, whether “the duties, salary,
and means of appointment for that office are specified by statute”; and
third, and most importantly, whether the employee exercises significant
duties and discretion.208 Applying those factors to the SEC ALJs, the
Bandimere majority concluded that SEC ALJs were inferior officers because the position was established by the Administrative Procedures Act,
statutes set forth the SEC ALJs’ duties, salaries, and hiring process, and
the “SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion in performing ‘important
functions’ commensurate with the STJs’ functions described in
Freytag.”209 The majority concluded:
199. 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016).
200. Id. at 1171.
201. Id. at 1177 (citing SEC Release No. 9972, 2015 WL 6575665, at *19).
202. See id. at 1182.
203. Id. at 1188.
204. Id. at 1174 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
205. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
206. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1175.
207. Id. at 1174–75; Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
208. Id. at 1182 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881).
209. Id. at 1181. (noting that the SEC ALJs’ exercise of authority included making
credibility findings to which the SEC gives “considerable weight;” “shap[ing] the administrative record by taking testimony;” ruling on discovery, admissibility of evidence and dis-
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In sum, SEC ALJs closely resemble the STJs described in Freytag.
Both occupy offices established by law; both have duties, salaries,
and means of appointment specified by statute; and both exercise
significant discretion while performing “important functions” that
are “more than ministerial tasks.” Further, both perform similar adjudicative functions as set out above. We therefore hold that the SEC
ALJs are inferior officers who must be appointed in conformity with
the Appointments Clause.210
The majority then explicitly rejected the SEC’s argument that Freytag
had relied on the STJs’ “final decision-making power” to decide STJs
were inferior officers.211 In doing so, the majority criticized the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Landry v. FDIC,212 upon which the SEC had relied. The
majority noted that the majority opinion in Landry misinterpreted
Freytag by placing undue weight on final decision-making authority of the
STJs.213
In contrast, the Bandimere dissent argued that the SEC ALJs’ lack of
“final decision-making authority,” should be determinative. The dissent
expressed concern about “the probable consequences” of the majority’s
holding, in that “all federal ALJs are at risk of being declared inferior
officers.”214
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Bandimere has caused a circuit split,
with the decision from the three judge panel of the D.C. Circuit in Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC.215 In that case, the D.C. Circuit applied
Landry, rather than Freytag, to hold that because the SEC ALJs do not
have final decision making authority, they are employees.216
The circuit split may not last long. The D.C. Circuit recently granted
the petitioner’s petition for rehearing en banc in Raymond J. Lucia Co.,
Inc. v. SEC.217 The parties have been directed to brief two issues: (1)
whether the SEC administrative law judge who handled the hearing is an
inferior officer rather than an employee, and (2) whether the court
should overrule Landry.218 Moreover, on the same date it granted en
banc review in Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc., the D.C. Circuit also granted
en banc review in the case of PHH Corp. v. CFPB.219 In PHH Corp., the
D.C. Circuit held that an independent agency with a single director head
positive motions; entering default judgments; and issuing initial decisions that publicly
“declare respondents liable and impose sanctions”).
210. Id. at 1181 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82; Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Comm’r,
930 F.2d 975, 986 (2d Cir. 1991)).
211. Id. at 1182–1185.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1184.
214. Id. at 1194 (McKay, C.J., dissenting).
215. Raymond J. Lucia Co., Inc. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g en
banc granted, judgment vacated (Feb. 16, 2017).
216. Id. at 283–89.
217. Id.
218. Order docketed, No. 15-1345 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
219. 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), reh’g granted, order vacacted (Feb. 16, 2017).
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violates Article II of the Constitution.220 Importantly, one issue to be
briefed is what the court should do if it decides in Raymond J. Lucia Co.,
Inc. that ALJs are inferior officers.221
It thus appears likely that the D.C. Circuit will reverse Raymond J.
Lucia Co., Inc. and hold that the SEC ALJs are inferior officers. Assuming that the court does so, the SEC will have to reappoint its ALJs, this
time constitutionally. But two questions remain. First, how can the SEC
fix the “thousands of [invalid] administrative actions” the unconstitutional ALJs have issued, and, second, are the multiple for-cause removal
restrictions constitutional?222
Less directly analogous, but still relevant, are the Supreme Court decisions in the military tribunal cases. The Supreme Court issued three opinions, following Freytag but preceding Landry, addressing the
Appointments Clause as it relates to judges presiding in military tribunals.223 The holdings in these cases suggest that officials (other than Article III judges) who preside over government adjudications are inferior
officers of the United States.
First, in Weiss v. United States, the plaintiff challenged the appointment
of military trial judges who were appointed by the President to be military officers, but who were never appointed to be military trial judges.224
The Court unanimously held that because the initial appointment of
those officers serving as judges was consistent with the Appointments
Clause, no reappointment was required.225 This case did not examine the
inferior officer distinction, but merely assumed that the military judges
were inferior officers.226
Second, in Ryder v. United States, the plaintiff challenged his criminal
conviction because the intermediate appellate court (named at that time
the Coast Guard Court of Military Review) included two civilian judges
whose appointments did not comply with the Appointments Clause.227
Unlike the trial judges in Weiss, these judges were not first appointed as
military officers; hence, they were never appointed to a military office in
220. Id. at *9.
221. Order docketed, No. 15-1345 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
222. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1189 (McKay, C.J., dissenting).
223. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 651 (1997); Ryder v. United States, 515
U.S. 177, 177 (1995); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 163 (1994).
224. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 170. The parties apparently stipulated that “military judges, because of the authority and responsibilities they possess, act as ‘Officers’ of the United
States.” Id. at 169, 173 (stating prior cases “undoubtedly establish the analytical framework
upon which to base the conclusion that a military judge is an ‘officer of the United
States’—a proposition to which both parties agree”).
225. Id. at 176. The justices disputed the issue of whether the military judges were “inferior Officers” or “principal officers,” not whether they were employees. See id. at 182–94
(Souter, J., concurring).
226. Because both parties did not dispute whether military trial judges were officers,
the Court simply assumed they were and focused on “whether these officers needed another appointment pursuant to the Appointments Clause before assuming their judicial
duties.” Id. at 170.
227. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 179.
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a manner that was consistent with the Appointments Clause.228 Without
further explanation, the Court seemingly agreed with the determination
of the Court of Military Appeals that the judges serving on the Coast
Guard Court of Military Review were inferior officers who needed to be
appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause.229 Significantly,
the Court made this presumption while disregarding the de facto officer
doctrine230 as well as the fact that the decisions of the appellate judges in
question were subject to review by a higher appellate court.231
Following the Weiss decision, the Secretary of Transportation corrected
the appointments infirmity by “adopting” the civilian judges as his own
“judicial appointments.” 232 A few years later, this retroactive adoptionappointment was challenged in Edmond v. United States. 233 In Edmond,
the issue was whether military trial judges were principal or inferior officers.234 The Court concluded these judges were “inferior officers,” because “[g]enerally speaking, the term ‘inferior officer’ connotes a
relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a
superior.”235 Notably, the fact that the military judges’ decisions were
subject to reversal on further appeal demonstrated that these judges
“have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States
unless permitted to do so by other Executive officers,” thus making them
inferior officers.236 In effect, determining the inferior officer status requires more than just looking at whether one holds a “[lower] rank” or
“responsibilities of a [lesser] magnitude;” the key is whether one is “directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”237
Edmonds provides the litmus test for distinguishing between principal
and inferior officers.238

228. Id. at 187–88.
229. See id. at 180 (noting that the Court of Military Appeals had relied on its holding
in U.S. v. Carpenter, 37 M.J. 291, that military judges are inferior officers).
230. The de facto officer doctrine is a doctrine that allows courts to validate “acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered
that the legality of that person’s appointment or election to office is deficient.” Id.
231. Id. at 187–88.
232. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 654 (1997).
233. Id. at 655–56.
234. Id. at 660–61.
235. Id. at 662.
236. Id. at 665. Justice Souter’s concurrence argued that more factors should be considered in determining whether these judges were principal or inferior officers, but in the end
agreed “that the judges . . . are inferior officers within the meaning of the Appointments
Clause.” Id. at 667-70 (Souter, J., concurring).
237. Id. at 663.
238. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. United States DOT, 821 F.3d 19, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(relying on Edmond to hold that because the arbitrator is not directed or supervised by
anyone, she is a principal officer who must be appointed by the president with the advice
and consent of the Senate).
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2. The Department of Justice Opinions
In addition to the case law just described,239 another relevant source,
the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice (DOJ), has addressed this issue, most recently in April 2007.240 After extensive analysis,
the DOJ concluded that a government employee is a federal officer when
that employee has a “continuing position” established by law that involves the application of the sovereign powers of the federal government.241 “The question for purposes of [this continuing position] is simply
whether [the] position possesses delegated sovereign authority to act in
the first instance, whether or not that act may be subject to direction or
review by superior officers.”242 According to the DOJ, it is not necessary
that employees have discretion or independent authority to be principal
or inferior officers.243 “[T]reating discretion as necessary for the existence
of an office conflicts with the original understanding of ‘office,’ early
practice, and early precedents.”244 Citing historic authority, the memo
notes that officers “were persons holding sovereign authority delegated
from the King that enabled them in conducting the affairs of government
to affect the people ‘against [their] will, and without [their] leave.’”245 In
contrast, a person whose position is “purely advisory” or who “provid[es]
goods and services” is not an officer.246
In addition, in 1991, the DOJ concluded that the Department of Education (DOE) ALJs were inferior officers because of their executive policy-making role.247 “By deciding a series of cases, the ALJ presumably
would develop interpretations of the statute and regulations and fill statutory and regulatory interstices comprehensively with his own policy judgments.”248 Indeed, to ensure that the DOE ALJs were not principal
officers, DOJ reasoned that ALJ “final opinions” must be reviewable by
the Secretary.249
239. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“There can be little doubt
that the role of the . . . administrative law judge . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a
judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge: He may
issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make
or recommend decisions.”).
240. See Bradbury, supra note 134, at 3.
241. Bradbury, supra note 134, at 1 (“That is, a position, however labeled, is in fact a
federal office if (1) it is invested by legal authority with a portion of the sovereign powers
of the federal Government, and (2) it is ‘continuing.’”).
242. Bradbury, supra note 134, at 19.
243. Bradbury, supra note 134, at 19. (“If it is not necessary to the existence of delegated sovereign authority (and thus to the existence of an office) that a position include the
exercise of discretion, all the more is it not necessary that a position include some sort of
‘independent’ discretion in carrying out sovereign functions.”).
244. Bradbury, supra note 134, at 18.
245. Bradbury, supra note 134, at 8 (citing King v. Burnell, Carth. 478 (K.B. 1700))
(alteration in original).
246. Bradbury, supra note 134, at 4.
247. Sec’y of Educ. Review of Admin. Law Judge Decisions, 15 U.S. Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 8, 14 (1991) [hereinafter Sec’y of Educ. Review].
248. Id. at 8, 14.
249. Id. at 15–16.
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3. The SEC ALJs are Inferior Officers
With this legal background, there should be little doubt that the SEC
ALJs are inferior officers. First, like the STJs in Freytag, the office of the
SEC ALJ and the duties, salary, and means of appointment are all established by law.250 Moreover, ALJs are permanent employees—unlike special masters.251
Second, like the STJs, the SEC ALJs perform more than ministerial
tasks: they regulate the course of proceedings, control the record of the
case, preside over the testimony of witnesses, determine credibility issues,
rule on the admissibility of evidence, issue subpoenas, issue sanctions, exclude people (including attorneys) from hearings, enter default judgments, and make substantive rulings and findings.252 Indeed, the SEC has
specifically chosen to give its ALJs as much power as possible under the
250. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557, 3105, 5311; 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1 (establishing ALJs and their
duties, salary, and means of appointment). The SEC has argued that the SEC ALJs are
employees because the APA does not require the SEC to use the ALJs. Gray Fin. Grp.,
Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and remanded, Hill v.
SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016). Likely, the SEC made this argument because
Judge Kavanagh noted this fact in his dissent in Free Enterprise. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanagh, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are good reasons the Board and the United States did not cite ALJs as a
precedent [for the argument that dual for-cause removal provisions violate separation of
powers]. First, an agency has the choice whether to use ALJs for hearings . . . Congress has
not imposed ALJs on the Executive Branch.”). However, Judge Kavanagh made this point
to respond to the issue of whether the dual for-cause removal provisions were problematic,
not to address whether SEC ALJs were inferior officers. Id. And this point does not appear to be relevant to the issue of whether the ALJs exercise significant authority. See
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 871 (finding STJs to be inferior officers even though the
Chief Judge of the Tax Court was not required to use them).
The SEC also argued that deference should be given to Congress’s view that the ALJ
removal process is constitutional. Gray, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1353–54. However, no deference
should be given to congressional choices that violate separation of powers, regardless of
whether they are longstanding. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–45 (1983) (holding
legislative veto to be unconstitutional despite its longstanding use). “[C]ongressional pronouncements are not dispositive . . . for purposes of separation of powers analysis under
the Constitution.” Dep’t of Transp. V. Ass’n of Am. R.R.,135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231 (2015).
Whether Congress had a longstanding belief that ALJs were employees should not be relevant to this Court in deciding the issues before it.
Lastly, the SEC suggested that ALJs are employees because they are placed in the competitive service system. Gray, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 1353–54. However, placement in the competitive service system is similarly irrelevant because that system includes all positions in
“the Government of the United States . . . including [principal officers] subject to Senate
confirmation.” Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 537–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§§ 2101, 2102(a)(l)(B), 2014); cf. Com. of Pa., Dept. of Health and Human Services, 80
F.3d 796, 804 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that title is not determinative of officer status; rather it
is the nature of a position that must be considered). The factors courts consider in making
the decision of inferior officer status are identified in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S.
651, 663 (1997); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82; Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 187–88
(1995); Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516 (1920); United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508, 511–12 (1878). None of these courts considered placement in the civil service
system.
251. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a).
252. 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (authority); 17 C.F.R. § 200.14 (powers); 17 C.F.R. § 201.180
(sanctions).
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APA.253 The SEC ALJs are not merely compiling a hearing record for
some higher entity to resolve.
Third, like the STJs, the SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion when
carrying out their duties.254 In short, the SEC ALJs have significant authority and substantial discretion in executing the laws of the United
States. Moreover, the SEC ALJs may formulate executive policy because
as they decide a series of cases, they interpret statutes and regulations, fill
statutory and regulatory interstices, and comprehensively make policy
judgments.255 This finding was essential to the DOJ’s conclusion that
DOE ALJs were inferior officers.256
Fourth, like the STJs, the SEC ALJs exercise powers of the government and have significant discretion in adjudicating enforcement proceedings involving major sanctions. The SEC ALJs’ initial decisions
regularly can and do become final, although the SEC must act to make
them final.257 Rightly or wrongly, this factor was held to be determinative
in Landry.258 By regulation, the SEC ALJ’s initial decision becomes the
SEC’s final order when there is no review of the initial decision.259 In
fact, in the majority of SEC administrative enforcement proceedings
there is no review; thus, the SEC ALJ’s initial decision regularly becomes
the final order. For example, in 2014, the SEC ALJs issued 186 initial
decisions, of which 174 (approximately 94%) became the SEC’s final order.260 Further, the SEC ALJ decisions are subject to review directly by
principal officers, the SEC Commissioners.261 Although these orders are
subject to review by the SEC, case law suggests that being subject to reversal does not render an inferior officer a non-officer employee.262 Indeed, in the words of Justice Scalia in Edmond, “[W]e think it evident
that ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised
at some level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”263
253. 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (“No provision of these Rules of Practice shall be construed to
limit the powers of the hearing officer provided by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. 556, 557.”).
254. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (“The hearing officer shall have the authority to do
all things necessary and appropriate to discharge his or her duties.”); 17 C.F.R. § 201.232
(discretion to issue subpoenas); 17 C.F.R. § 201.320 (discretion to receive and exclude evidence); 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (duty to prepare an initial decision, including “findings and
conclusion, and the reasons or basis therefor, as to all the material issues of fact, law or
discretion presented on the record”).
255. Sec’y of Educ. Review, supra note 247, at 14.
256. Id.
257. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360; 17 C.F.R. § 201.411.
258. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1225, 1134 (2000).
259. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360; 17 C.F.R. § 201.411.
260. See ALJ Initial Decisions: Administrative Law Judges, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 12, 2016), http://www.sec.gov/alj/aljdec/aljdecarchive/aljdecarc
2014.shtml. [https://perma.cc/N8DZ-ATV5].
261. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d).
262. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991).
263. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
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In short, the DOJ’s opinion, coupled with the Supreme Court decisions
in Freytag and the military cases, strongly suggest that the SEC ALJs are
“inferior officers.” They appear indistinguishable from military judges,
the STJs, and even U.S. magistrates.
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion suggested that whether
SEC ALJs were inferior officers was an unresolved, disputed issue.264
However, “the Court has held that district-court clerks, thousands of
clerks within the Treasury and Interior Departments, an assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, federal marshals, military
judges, Article I [Tax Court special trial] judges, and the general counsel
for the Transportation Department are inferior officers.”265 It would not
be a stretch to include the SEC ALJs, or all ALJs for that matter, to this
list.
B. APPOINTMENTS
1. The SEC ALJs are Unconstitutionally Appointed
The Constitution provides that “Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”266 Pursuant to this language, Congress must identify which of these three entities
will appoint the SEC ALJs,267 who are inferior officers.268 By statute,
264. 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010) (“[O]ur holding does not address that subset of independent agency employees who serve as administrative law judges . . . Whether administrative law judges are necessarily ‘Officers of the United States’ is disputed.”) (citing Landry,
204 F.3d at 1125); accord, Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 699 n.8 (Kavanagh, J., dissenting)
(stating that “many ALJs are employees, not officers) (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d
1125, 1132–34 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“ALJs in FDIC are employees because they possess only
recommendatory powers that are subject to de novo review by agency.”)).
Both Justice Roberts and Judge Kavanagh cite only one case to support their assertions
on this issue: Landry. Kavanagh cites Landry to support his conclusion that “many ALJs
are employees, not officers,” Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 699 n.8 (Kavanagh, J., dissenting), and Roberts cites Landry to support his assertion that “[w]hether administrative law
judges are necessarily ‘Officers of the United States’ is disputed,” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010). Neither judge cited the Supreme Court’s most relevant holding that special trial judges for the tax court are inferior
officers. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 869–922 (1991). While neither judge thus
suggests that Landry resolves this issue, anyone asserting the SEC ALJs are “inferior officers” will need to explain why the reasoning in Landry either was wrong or is not relevant
to SEC ALJs.
265. Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 812 (2013)
(citing Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing cases)); see also
General Counsel, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/general-counsel [https://perma.cc/HHC7-WPPF] (suggesting that the CIA General Counsel is
an inferior officer).
266. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
267. The Appointments Clause applies to all agency officers, including those whose
functions are “predominately quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative,” and regardless of
whether the agency officers are “independent of the Executive in their day-to-day operations.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133 (1976) (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States,
295 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1935)).
268. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2.
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Congress has identified that each agency or department head shall appoint its ALJs.269 The SEC is a “Department” of the United States and its
Commissioners function collectively as its “Head.”270 Therefore, the SEC
Commissioners must appoint the SEC ALJs.
However, the SEC Commissioners do not appoint the SEC ALJs.271
Because the SEC ALJs are not appointed pursuant to the identified procedure in Article II, their appointment is unconstitutional.272 Even the
SEC does not dispute that if the SEC ALJs are inferior officers, then the
current appointment process likely violates the Constitution.273 The SEC
argues that its ALJs are not inferior officers but mere employees.274
2. Why the SEC Will Not Fix the Unconstitutional Appointments
There may be a relatively “easy cure” to this constitutional infirmity—
the SEC Commissioners could simply appoint the current ALJs directly,
as the Secretary of Transportation did after Weiss.275 However, the SEC
has so far refused to take this simple corrective measure.276 It is unclear
why; however, it is possible that the SEC is concerned that such an action
would be tantamount to an admission that the appointment process was
unconstitutional. With such an admission, pending and existing SEC orders could be subject to challenge.
The SEC’s concern may have validity. In 2014, the Supreme Court de269. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
270. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 511 (2010)
(noting that “the common, near-contemporary definition of a ‘department’ as a ‘separate
allotment or part of business” and that even though the SEC was created as an independent agency, “[b]ecause the Commission is a freestanding component of the Executive
Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such component, it constitutes a
‘Departmen[t]’ for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.”).
271. Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082,
at *35 (N.D. Ga. Aug 4, 2015); Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–26, Tilton v. SEC, No.
15-CV-2472 (RA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85015 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015), aff’d 824 F.3d
276 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 15-CV-2472-RA) [hereinafter Tilton Transcript] (The SEC’s attorney “acknowledge[d] that the commissioners were not the ones who appointed [the ALJ
presiding in that case].”).
272. See Timbervest, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35.
273. Tilton Transcript, supra note 271, at 29 (The judge asked the SEC’s attorney, “If I
find that the ALJs are inferior officers, do you necessarily lose?” To which the attorney
responded, “We acknowledge that, your Honor, if this Court were to find ALJ Foelk to be
an inferior officer, that would make it more likely that the plaintiffs can succeed on the
merits for the Article II challenge. . . .”).
274. Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and remanded 825
F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he SEC contends ALJs are ‘mere employees’ based upon
Congress’s treatment of them and the fact that they cannot issue final orders and do not
have contempt power.”); but see Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016) (“vacat[ing] the district court’s preliminary injunction orders and remand[ing] with instructions
to dismiss each case for lack of jurisdiction” because Congress intended “to channel all
objections to a final Commission order . . . into the administrative forum.”).
275. See id. at 1320; Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 654 (1997).
276. Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357 (RMB)(SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124444, at *65
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015) (referencing its previous decision in Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ.
357 (RMB)(SN), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100999, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015), where the
SEC refused to cure the Appointments Clause violation).
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cided NLRB v. Noel Canning.277 In that case, the Supreme Court held
that President Obama improperly appointed three commissioners to the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) using the recess process.278 The
Court held that the commissioners’ appointments were invalid because
the Senate was not in recess when the appointments were made.279 The
Court’s decision immediately affected Noel Canning by invalidating the
NLRB’s decision that that company had engaged in an unfair labor practice.280 But the Court’s holding had a much more significant impact. All
the cases the NLRB had resolved in the eighteen-month period between
January 4, 2012, (the day the President made the invalid recess appointments) and August 5, 2013, (the day the Senate confirmed nominees for
the vacancies) were potentially invalid.281
The NLRB’s response was swift. The same day the Supreme Court issued its decision, the chair of the NLRB issued a statement noting that
the agency would “analyz[e] the impact that the Court’s decision has on
Board cases in which the January 2012 recess appointees participated.”282
He further emphasized that the NLRB “[was] committed to resolving any
cases affected by [the Court’s] decision as expeditiously as possible.”283
Shortly thereafter, the NLRB modified or set aside orders in forty-three
cases pending in federal court and filed motions to vacate orders on appeal in forty-nine other pending cases.284 Additionally, the NLRB promised to reexamine all orders not yet appealed to federal court.285 Finally,
the NLRB had to evaluate whether its appointment of some regional directors and the actions of those regional directors were valid.286 In sum,
the short-term and long-term consequences of the Noel Canning decision
were far more complex than the Court likely anticipated when it claimed
that its holding would not “render illegitimate thousands of recess appointments reaching all the way back to the founding era.”287 Moreover,
the aftermath of Noel Canning was not the first time the NLRB had to
revisit the validity of its orders. In 2010, in New Process Steel, L.P. v.
NLRB, the Supreme Court held that the NLRB lacked authority to issue
277. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2550 (2014).
278. Id. at 2556–57.
279. Id. (holding that a three day vacancy was too short to be considered a recess).
280. Mark L. Shapiro et al., The Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision and the
NLRB’s Response, MONDAQ (July 17, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/3280
48/employee+rights+labour+relations/The+Supreme+Courts+Noel+Canning+Decision+
and+the+NLRBs+Response [https://perma.cc/KSG9-ECMN] [hereinafter Noel Canning
Decision].
281. Noel Canning Decision, supra note 280.
282. Statement of NLRB Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce on the Supreme Court’s Noel
Canning Decision, NLRB OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (June 26, 2014), https://www.nlrb
.gov/news-outreach/news-story/statement-nlrb-chairman-mark-gaston-pearce-supremecourts-noel-canning/ [https://perma.cc/X528-H5GK].
283. Id.
284. Noel Canning Decision, supra note 280.
285. Noel Canning Decision, supra note 280.
286. Noel Canning Decision, supra note 280.
287. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577 (2014).
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orders without a quorum.288 In response, the NLRB simply re-issued all
of the orders that had been issued by the two-member panels.289
In these two instances, the timeframes and, hence, the number of affected orders, were relatively small. If a court concludes that the SEC is
appointing its ALJs in a manner that violates the Constitution, the impact
will likely be more substantial. It is unclear how long the SEC has been
appointing its ALJs in this manner and, thus, how many orders pending
and issued would be potentially invalid.290 Thus, the SEC may rightly be
concerned with appearing to concede that its appointment process is unconstitutional or even trying to fix something the SEC does not believe to
be broken; the potential impact could be staggering.291
C. REMOVAL
While the Constitution explicitly provides for the appointment of principal and inferior officers, it does not explicitly provide for their removal
in most situations. 292 Rather, the Constitution contains only one removal
provision. That provision states that “all civil Officers of the United
288. 560 U.S. 674, 676 (2010).
289. Noel Canning Decision, supra note 280.
290. The SEC has so far refused to answer discovery regarding how long it has been
appointing its ALJs in such manner and how many orders these potentially unconstitutional ALJs have issued. See Why the SEC’s Proposed Changes to Its Rules of Practice Are
Woefully Inadequate—Part III, SECURITIES DIARY (Nov. 18, 2015), https://securitiesdiary
.com/2015/11/18/why-the-secs-proposed-changes-to-its-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-iii/ [https://perma.cc/2LAH-W9FH].
291. Alternatively, the SEC Commissioners may take another approach. In Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012), the D.C.
Circuit held that three copyright royalty judges who comprised the Copyright Royalty
Board were unconstitutionally appointed. The court resolved the unconstitutionality problem by severing the statutory provision that authorized the Librarian of Congress power to
remove the judges. Id. at 1336–37, 1340. Because the judges were not validly appointed at
the time they issued the challenged determination, the court vacated and remanded without reaching the merits of Intercollegiate’s challenge. Id. at 1332. After remand, the Librarian appointed new copyright royalty judges, who reviewed the existing, written record to
resolve the remanded case. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796
F.3d 111 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The new judges refused to reopen that record, allow additional
submissions, or conduct new hearings because the Board decided not to hold new evidentiary hearings as Intercollegiate had “fail[ed] . . . to point to any instance of an exclusion of
relevant evidence that affected the outcome of the proceeding, or to any portion of the
Final Determination that turned on witness credibility.” Id. at 116. The D.C. Circuit found
“nothing in the proceedings leading up to and including the new Board’s determination
that suggests a lack of independence from the previous, constitutionally defective determination” and held that review of the existing, written record by the properly-appointed
panel was sufficient in this case. Id. at 123. Cf., Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 212–14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the temporary director of
OTS, who was validly appointed, ratified an order issued by an improperly appointed “acting director”); FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the
remedy of dismissal was not warranted by FEC’s unconstitutional composition when the
FEC reconstituted itself after the finding of unconstitutionality and potentially “rubberstamp[ed]” its prior decision).
292. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 516 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]ith the exception of the general ‘vesting’ and ‘take care’ language, the Constitution is completely ‘silent with respect to the power of removal from
office.’”) (quoting Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 258 (1839)).
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States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 293 The
impeachment process is seldom used. 294 Officers are removed other than
by impeachment.295 How is removal possible? Because the Constitution
did not “‘expressly take[ ] away’” the removal power from the President,
the President is presumed to have this power to oversee executive officers. 296
Because the President’s ability to remove an officer is an important
means of controlling that officer,297 the removal power compliments the
appointment power.298 The power is not absolute; Congress may limit the
President’s removal power to ensure an officer’s independence.299 The
clash between the executive’s desire for unfettered removal power and
the legislature’s desire to limit such power impacts separation of powers—the doctrine that helps to ensure that each governmental branch
maintains its own separate function.300 Congress has limited the President’s ability to remove the SEC ALJs by providing for multiple levels of
for-cause removal protection. The question is whether Congress can do so
without violating separation of powers.
1. The Supreme Court’s Removal Cases
Likely because the Constitution does not explicitly define the executive’s power to remove officers, the Supreme Court has proffered conflicting direction in the cases it has examined since Marbury v.

293. U.S. Const. Art. II, § 4.
294. WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 60–61 (5th ed.
2016).
295. Id. at 61.
296. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492 (citing Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (June 30, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JUNE-AUGUST 1789, 893 (Charlene Bangs
Bickford ed., 2004)).
297. FUNK & SEAMON, supra note 294, at 60.
298. Long ago in Myers v. United States, the Court struck down a statute that required
the President to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate prior to removing the postmaster general. 272 U.S. 52, 107–08, 118, 176 (1926). According to the Court, the power to
remove a federal officer necessarily accompanied the constitutionally granted power to
appoint that officer. Id. at 122, 126–27, 163–64. The power to remove did not flow from the
constitutionally granted power to advise on and consent to that appointment. Id.
299. The Court in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, for example, upheld a removal
provision limiting the President’s ability to remove a commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” in part
because the FTC was designed to be independent and free from domination and control of
the President. 295 U.S. 602, 619, 629, 632 (1935); accord Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
693 (1988) (noting that “the congressional determination to limit the removal power of the
Attorney General was essential . . . to establish the necessary independence of the office”).
300. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1127, 1132–33 (2000).
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Madison.301 The Supreme Court302 first addressed the validity of executive removal in 1839 in Ex parte Hennen.303 In Hennen, an inferior officer
sought mandamus after he was removed from his position as a district
court clerk.304 The Court rejected the clerk’s argument that his removal
was unconstitutional under Article II.305 The relevant statute contained
no removal limitation, and the Court refused to imply one.306 Silence, the
Court held, meant that the executive retained full removal power.307 The
Court reasoned that when Congress fails to provide for removal of inferior officers, because (1) the Constitution likely does not intend those officers to hold term for life,308 (2) the power of removal is incidental to the
power of appointment,309 and (3) “[t]he appointment of clerks of the
court properly belongs to the courts of law,” the courts would also have
removal power.310 Hence, Hennen was out of luck.
Similarly, in Parsons v. United States, the Court again refused to imply
a removal limitation in a statute that did not contain one.311 In this case,
the Court held that Congress had not intended to limit the President’s
power to remove an inferior officer, a district attorney.312 The relevant
statute provided that “[d]istrict attorneys shall be appointed for a term of
four years” and did not contain any provision addressing removal.313 Like
it had in Hennen,314 the Court refused to imply a removal limitation.315 In
refusing to imply the removal limitation, the Court iterated the long understanding of both Congress and the executive that the removal power
301. 5 U.S. 137, 162 (1803) (“[A]s the law creating the office [of justice of the peace]
gave the officer a right to hold it for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights, which are protected by the
laws of this country.”). The Court subsequently rejected this statement as obiter dictum in
Myers v. United States. 272 U.S. 52, 141 (1926).
302. While state supreme courts had addressed this issue, this case is the first where the
U.S. Supreme Court discussed executive removal. See, e.g., Avery v. Inhabitants of
Tyringham, 3 Mass. 160, 176–77 (1807).
303. Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. 230 (1839).
304. Id. at 256.
305. Id. at 261–62.
306. See id. at 258–59 (While the 1st section of the Act of May 18, 1820, 3 Story, 1790
did limit the tenure of certain officers to a four-year term: “[C]lerks of Courts are not
included within this law, and there is no express limitation in the Constitution, or laws of
Congress, upon the tenure of the [clerks’] office.” Thus, because the tenure for the office of
clerks is not fixed, these officers are “removable at pleasure.”).
307. See id. at 258–59 (maintaining that because “[t]the Constitution is silent with respect to the power of removal from office, where the tenure is not fixed,” the tenure of the
clerks’ office “must be held at the will and discretion of some department of the government, and subject to removal at pleasure,” and “although no power to remove is expressly
given, yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their office at the will and discretion of the head of the department”).
308. Id. at 259.
309. Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259.
310. Id. at 258.
311. Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 338–39 (1897).
312. Id.
313. See id. at 327–28.
314. See Hennen, 38 U.S. at 258–59.
315. Parsons, 167 U.S. at 343.
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was an inherent power of the executive.316 The Court then described the
well-known battle over the first Tenure of Office Act, which had prohibited the executive from exercising any removal without the advice and
consent of the Senate.317 Despite the fact that the Tenure of Office Act
had been repealed before Parsons was appointed,318 the Court examined
the statute’s drafting history and applied the constitutional avoidance canon, refusing to imply any limitation on the executive’s removal power.319
In the statutes at issue in Hennen and Parsons, Congress did not expressly limit the removal power of the entity appointing the inferior officers; hence, the Supreme Court refused to imply such a limitation in
either statute. In contrast, in United States v. Perkins, the Court reviewed
a statute in which Congress had included a removal limitation in the statute.320 In Perkins, a naval cadet, an inferior officer, was honorably discharged because his services were no longer required during
peacetime.321 He sued for accrued salary.322 The relevant statutes barred
his peacetime discharge except “for misconduct.”323 The issue for the
Court was whether Congress could limit the executive’s removal authority in this way when appointment was vested in the head of a department
rather than in the President.324 The Court held that Congress could impose removal limits under these circumstances.325 According to the
Court, when Congress “vests the appointment of inferior officers in the
heads of departments, it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it
deems best for the public interest.”326 In other words, Congress’s power
to vest appointments in an entity other than the executive provided Congress with the concomitant power to limit that entity’s removal capabilities.327 Notably, the President retained removal power over the
department head: the Secretary of the Navy.328
These early cases provided a framework for removal: the Court’s holdings in Hennen and Parsons suggest that because the power to remove
accompanies the power to appoint, the Court will not imply removal limi316. Id.
317. With first Tenure of Office Act, Congress attempted to prevent the President from
removing officers “friendly to the views of congress.” Id. at 339 (citing Tenure of Office
Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867)).).
318. Id. at 342.
319. Id. at 343.
320. 116 U.S. 483, 483–84 (citing Army Appropriation Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 176, 14
REV. STAT. 90 (1866)).
321. See id. at 483.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 485 (citing Act of Aug. 5, 1882, §§ 1229, 1525, 22 Rev. Stat. 219).
324. Id. at 484 (“Whether or not Congress can restrict the power of removal incident to
the power of appointment of those officers who are appointed by the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, under the authority of the Constitution (article 2,
section 2) does not arise in this case, and need not be considered.”).
325. Id. at 485.
326. Perkins, 116 U.S. at 485.
327. Id.
328. Id. (the head of the department is the Secretary of the Navy); see Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 494, 494 n.3 (2010).
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tations in statutes that do not contain them. In other words, Congress
must provide a clear statement that the executive’s removal power is limited because no limitation will be implied. In addition, the Court’s holding in Perkins suggests that when Congress explicitly includes removal
limitations, the Court will uphold them, at least when someone other than
the executive holds appointment power. Notably, in all of these cases, the
Court examined the legitimacy of removal restrictions regarding inferior
officers; the Court had yet329 to address the legitimacy of removal limitations regarding principal officers.
In 1926, in Myers v. United States, the Court addressed that issue:
whether the President has unfettered power under the Constitution to
remove officers “whom he has appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”330 Plaintiff Myers was appointed to be a postmaster
in Portland, Oregon, for a four-year term.331 Before the term’s conclusion, the President removed him.332 Myers sued for his salary from the
date of removal.333 The relevant statute provided, “‘Postmasters of the
first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by
the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall
hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law.’”334 The Senate had not consented to Myers’s removal.335
The issue for the Court was whether the removal limitation (requiring the
advice and consent of the Senate) was constitutional.336 But a threshold
issue also had to be addressed: was Myers a principal or inferior officer?
The Court suggested, without really deciding, that Myers was a principal officer.337 The Court reasoned that because Congress vested appointment of postmasters in the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, the postmaster must be a principal officer.338 This circular reasoning is likely incorrect. Like principal officers, Congress has the power to
vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President subject to the
Senate’s advice and consent.339 Unlike principal officers, Congress also
has the power to vest the appointment of inferior officers in courts of law
329. In United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, the issue of whether the President had
the power to remove a territorial judge was argued but not decided. 58 U.S 284, 302–03
(1845).
330. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 107 (citing Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, 19 Stat. 78, 80, 81).
335. Id. at 107–08.
336. Myers, 272 U.S. at 107–08.
337. Id. at 158–65.
338. Id. at 163 (quoting Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315 (1903) (“Congress
has regarded the office as of sufficient importance to make it proper to fill it by an appointment to be made by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It has thereby classed it as
appropriately coming under the direct supervision of the President and to be administered
by officers appointed by him (and confirmed by the Senate) with reference to his constitutional responsibility to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Art. 2, sec. 3.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
339. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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and heads of departments instead.340 Hence, the method of appointment
should not dictate whether an officer is principal or inferior. Regardless,
the Court understood Myers to be a principal officer.
The Court then held that Congress could not limit the executive’s removal power to remove officers exercising executive powers.341 To reach
its holding, the Court examined in excruciating detail342 the views of the
first Congress343 regarding the nature of the executive power and the importance of the take care clause.344 The Court concluded that for the
President to have “confidence in the intelligence, ability, judgment or loyalty of [his executive subordinates,] he must have the power to remove
him without delay.”345 To require the President to file for-cause charges
and submit those charges to the Senate “might make impossible that
unity and coordination in executive administration essential to effective
action.”346
But the Court did not stop there. Expansively, the Court extended its
reasoning to officers exercising quasi-adjudicatory powers as well:
Of course there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question
whether the President may overrule or revise the officer’s interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance. Then there may be
duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and
members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect
interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President cannot
in a particular case properly influence or control. But even in such a
case he may consider the decision after its rendition as a reason for
removing the officer, on the ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised. Otherwise he does not discharge his own
constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.347
According to the majority, the President’s unfettered removal power
thus flowed from the President’s “constitutional duty of seeing that the
laws be faithfully executed.”348 Hence, even in the case of quasi-judicial
officers, the President must retain the power to remove those below him.
340. Id.
341. Myers, 272 U.S. at 163–64.
342. Or, as noted in a later case, “These opinions examine at length the historical, legislative, and judicial data bearing upon the question, beginning with what is called ‘the decision of 1789’ in the first Congress and coming down almost to the day when the opinions
were delivered. They occupy 243 pages of the volume in which they are printed.”
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935).
343. Compare Myers, 272 U.S. at 109–35, with Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324,
327–34 (1897) (describing the same history in fewer pages).
344. Myers, 272 U.S. at 108–09. The Court also cited the Commander in Chief Clause,
the Appointments Clause, the Impeachment Clause, and the Faithfully Execute Clause. Id.
at 108–09 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3, 4).
345. Id. at 134.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 135.
348. Id.
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The Court’s reliance on the Take Care Clause gave the dissent pause.
As if foreshadowing the current controversy regarding the SEC ALJs,
Justice Holmes warned that “arguments drawn from the executive power
of the President, and from his duty to appoint officers of the United
States (when Congress does not vest the appointment elsewhere), to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed, and to commission all officers of
the United States, seem to [be] spider’s webs inadequate to control the
dominant facts.”349
The Court’s holding and reasoning in Myers was consistent with the
Court’s holdings and reasoning in Hennen and Parsons, in which the
Court had refused to imply removal restrictions because of the inherent
power of the executive to remove officers. However, the Court’s holding
and reasoning in Myers was inconsistent with the Court’s holding and
reasoning in Perkins, in which the Court had upheld an express removal
provision. To explain the different outcome, the Court could have distinguished the plaintiff in Perkins because he was an inferior officer. Indeed,
Justice Roberts later suggested in Free Enterprise that the nature of the
officer’s status was determinative in these early removal cases.350 Justice
Roberts was incorrect.351
Instead, the Myers Court distinguished Perkins not by focusing on the
inferior nature of the officer in that case, but by focusing on who held the
removal power.352 In Myers, Congress had retained some removal power
for itself; in contrast, in Perkins, Congress merely placed “incidental” restrictions (for-cause removal during peacetime) on the head of a department’s ability to remove an officer.353 Such incidental restrictions on the
executive were legitimate, the Court reasoned, because Congress did not
aggrandize its own power at the expense of the Executive.354 The Court
underscored that it had never allowed Congress “to draw to itself, or to
either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the
exercise of [the removal] power. To do this would be to go beyond the
words and implications of that clause, and to infringe the constitutional
principle of the separation of governmental powers.”355 Hence, when
Congress vests appointment power in an entity other than the President,
349. Id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
350. Free Enter. Fund. v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 (2010)
(holding that “the Board members are inferior officers,” because the Commission has the
power to remove Board members “at will”).
351. See generally, Peter L. Strauss, On the Difficulties of Generalization -Pcaobi N the
Footsteps of Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison, and Freytag, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
2255 (2011)(criticizing Free Enterprise).
352. According to the Court in Myers, whether an officer is principal or inferior should
have no bearing on whether the limitation on the President’s removal power is constitutional; rather, the focus should turn to who holds this power in compliance with the Constitution. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 164–76. So even though the Court may have incorrectly held
that the postmaster in that case was a principal officer, when in all likelihood he was inferior, this difference did not matter to the Court. See id. at 160–61.
353. Myers, 272 U.S. at 161.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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Congress can place for-cause restrictions on that entity’s power to remove an officer. However, when Congress gives itself a role in the President’s power to remove an officer, Congress crosses the line.
The majority’s holding in Myers soon proved to be too broad. In 1935
in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Court retreated from this
broad description of the President’s removal power.356 The relevant act in
Humphrey’s Executor established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
an independent agency, and contained a for-cause removal provision.357
That provision limited the President from removing an FTC Commissioner unless for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”358 The FTC Commissioners are principal officers. 359 Like it did in
Myers, however, the Court ignored the distinction between principal and
inferior officers.
Despite the language in Myers suggesting that the President’s removal
power was sacrosanct, the Court upheld the for-cause removal limitation
in Humphrey’s Executor.360 In doing so, the Court acknowledged that the
language quoted above regarding quasi-judicial officers might suggest
that the for-cause removal provision was unconstitutional.361 But the
Court rejected the language as dicta.362 Instead, Myers, the Court said,
was distinguishable in a number of ways.363 The most critical difference
between the two cases was the type of power the officers exercised.364
The Court noted that the postmaster in Myers had performed purely executive functions and, therefore, had to be responsive to the President.365
Myers had no quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power.366
In contrast, the FTC Commissioners in Humphrey’s Executor performed both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers.367 The Court reasoned that the power the FTC Commissioners exercised required that
they be independent from the President.368 Thus, the Court expressly lim356. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935).
357. The Federal Trade Commission Act, chc. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41).
358. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620 (quoting The Federal Trade Commission Act, c.
311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41)).
359. While the Court did not expressly state that the FTC Commissioners are principal
officers, it was implied because under The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41,
42, all Commissioners must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate. See id. at 619–20.
360. Id. at 632.
361. Id. at 632; see supra text accompanying note 347.
362. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–28.
363. Id. at 627.
364. Id. at 631–32.
365. Id. at 631–32.
366. Id. at 627.
367. Id. at 626, 628 (expressly “disapprov[ing]” statements in Myers that suggested that
the President had an inherent constitutional power to remove members of quasi-judicial
bodies).
368. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–28 (“A postmaster is an executive officer restricted to the performance of executive functions. He is charged with no duty at all related
to either the legislative or judicial power. The actual decision in the Myers case finds support in the theory that such an officer is merely one of the units in the executive depart-
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ited Myers, saying that Myers did not apply to “an officer who occupies
no place in the executive department and who exercises no part of the
executive power vested by the Constitution in the President.”369
In addition to considering the nature of the officer’s powers, the Court
highlighted two other important differences between Myers and
Humphrey’s Executor. First, the Court pointed out that Congress had intended the FTC and its Commissioners to be independent from the President, unlike the post office and postmasters.370 Second, the Court noted
that the FTC Commissioners’ tenure was limited to seven years.371 Both
factors further supported the legitimacy of the removal limitations. Thus,
the Court limited the Myers holding: no longer did the President have
unfettered authority to remove all officers. After Humphrey’s Executor,
the President had unfettered authority to remove “all purely executive
officers.”372 Pursuant to what we will call the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction, Congress may not limit a President’s power to remove purely executive officers, but Congress may limit his power to remove quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial officers, especially when such officers’ tenure is timelimited.373
The Myers/Humphrey’s distinction held firm for half a century. For example, in 1958, the Court applied this distinction in Wiener v. United
States, to hold that Congress could limit the President’s power to remove
a member of the War Claims Commission.374 Wiener refused to resign
when asked to do so by President Eisenhower.375 Wiener filed suit in the
Court of Claims to recover his unpaid salary.376 The relevant act provided
that the commissioners had very limited tenure (three years). 377 The act
did not have an explicit removal provision. 378 The issue for the Court was
whether the act contained an implied for-cause removal provision.379 You
ment and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of removal by
the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid he is.”).
369. Id. at 628.
370. Id. at 628–30.
371. Id. at 623–34; but see Shrutleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316 (1903) (holding
that while an inferior officer had limited tenure, Congress had not explicitly intended to
limit the President’s general removal power). Note that the limited tenure of the officer
had also played no role in the Court’s decision in Hennen, Parsons, and Myers.
372. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628.
373. Id. at 631–32; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127–28 (1926). Some commentators have suggested that the Court in Humphrey’s Executor used a functionalist approach. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office:
Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1109 n.321
(1994). We are not so sure. At best, the Court may have approached the separation of
powers question from a functionalist approach (asking how it could uphold the limitation),
then crafted a formalist bright-line rule for future cases. However, the Court based its
distinction of the legitimacy of the removal restriction on the type of power the officer
exercised. Myers, 272 U.S. at 134–35. Such a distinction is classically formalist.
374. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
375. Id. at 350.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 351 (noting that the issue was a “variant of the constitutional issue decided in
[Humphrey’s Executor]”).

2017]

Shadow of Free Enterprise

45

will recall that the Court had refused in Hennen and Parsons to imply forcause removal limitations, but it upheld an express removal provision in
Perkins.380 Had the Court followed those three cases, the Court would
have required Congress to limit removal expressly.381 However, the
Court did not cite Hennen, Parsons, or Perkins. Additionally, the Court
did not discuss whether the War Claims Commissioners were principal or
inferior officers and whether this difference mattered to its holding.382
Instead, the Court cited Myers and Humphrey’s Executor.383 The Court
noted that Humphrey’s Executor had limited Myers’s holding to apply
only to “purely executive officers.384 The War Claims Commission was a
quasi-adjudicatory body, and Congress intended for the commissioners to
be “‘entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect,’ of either the Executive or the Congress.”385 The Court assumed
that Congress, when it enacted the relevant statute,386 had been aware
that the holding in Humphrey’s Executor rested on the purely-executivepower distinction; thus, the Court reasoned that Congress’s “failure of
explicitness” in providing for removal was telling.387 By failing to provide
a removal limitation, Congress actually meant to include one, the Court
reasoned.388 The Court held that the President had neither the constitutional nor statutory power to remove a War Claims Commissioner, who is
a “member of an adjudicatory body.”389 In short, without distinguishing,
let alone mentioning, Hennen, Parsons, or Perkins, the Court relied on
the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction to imply a removal limitation, even
though Congress provided no clear statement that it intended any such
limitation. With Wiener, the pendulum on the President’s removal powers
swung completely in the opposite direction of Myers.
Similarly, in 1986, the Court applied the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction
in Bowsher v. Synar.390 In Bowsher, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.391 That Act authorized the
comptroller general, a principal officer,392 to (1) determine whether the
President and Congress were abiding by federal deficit caps, and (2) im380. See supra text accompanying notes 305–306, 313, 315, 320, 325.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 305–306, 313, 315, 320, 325.
382. The War Claims Commissioners are similar to ALJs, in that both have limited
quasi-adjudicatory power. See infra text accompanying note 389.
383. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 351–52.
384. Id. at 352.
385. Id. at 355–56 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629
(1935)).
386. The relevant statute was the War Claims Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-896, 62 Stat.
1240, whereby Congress created the War Claims Commission but did not include a provision for the removal of commissioners in successive legislation. Id. at 349–50.
387. Id. at 352.
388. See id. at 353–54.
389. Id. at 356.
390. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724–25 (1986).
391. Also known as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 901 et. seq.).
392. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722–23 (quoting the Constitutional provision for principal officer appointment).
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plement cuts when necessary.393 The Act provided that the comptroller
general could be removed by a joint resolution of Congress, which was
subject to presidential veto.394 The reasons Congress could offer for removal included permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, committing a felony, or committing other conduct involving
moral turpitude.395 Like it had in the statute at issue in Myers, Congress
had again aggrandized itself by inserting itself into the removal process.
The Court struck down the Act, finding the removal provision to be
unconstitutional.396 According to the Court, the comptroller general’s
functions were the “very essence” of executing the law.397 The Court reasoned that Congress could not vest authority to execute the laws in the
comptroller general precisely because Congress retained the power to remove him.398 According to the Court, the legislative history was very
clear that Congress had included the removal provision specifically so
that “[i]f [the comptroller general] does not do his work properly, [Congress], as practically his employers, ought to be able to discharge him
from his office.”399 Although the dissent believed that the “for cause”
removal limitations effectively limited Congress’s removal power, making
the Act constitutional, the majority disagreed.400 The for-cause standard
was too broad and vague to limit Congress’s power.401 The Court explained that after Congress passes a law, Congress can influence the execution of that law only by passing new legislation or by impeachment.402
“The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute
the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess.”403 In Bowsher, as in Myers, the Court held
that Congress did not have the authority to retain for itself any ability to
remove an executive officer.404 Rather, because the officer exercised executive authority, the President’s removal power could not be limited.405
As it had in Wiener, the Court again ignored Hennen, Parsons, and Perkins. Perhaps the Court did so because the relevant officer was a principal
rather than an inferior officer, although the Court did not mention this
distinction.
After Bowsher, the law seemed clear. The President needs the ability to
control executive officers that work for him so that he can faithfully execute the laws; however, the President has less need to control those who
exercise quasi-adjudicative and quasi-legislative powers. Hence, pursuant
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

Id. at 732–33.
Id. at 728, 728 n.7 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)B (1995)).
Id. at 728, 728 n.7 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)B (1995)).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 733.
Bowsher, 478 U.S at 726–27, 733–34.
Id. at 728–29 (quoting 58 CONG. REC. 7136 (1921)).
Id. at 729–32.
Id. at 729–30.
Id. at 726.
Id.
Bowsher, 478 U.S at 726–27.
Id.
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to the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction, Congress cannot limit the President’s ability to remove “purely executive officers,” but can limit the
President’s ability to remove quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative officers. Additionally, under Perkins, Myers, and Bowsher, Congress cannot
reserve for itself any power over the removal of executive officers, but it
can limit the removal powers of the heads of departments when they hold
appointment power. Whether an officer was inferior or principal appeared irrelevant to the analysis.
Just two years after Bowsher, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court abruptly
changed course and rejected the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction in the
case of a “purely executive” inferior officer.406 The act at issue in Morrison was the Ethics in Government Act.407 In that Act, Congress established the office of independent counsel, whose function was to
“investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking Government officials” involved in criminal activity.408 The Act provided that the
attorney general, a principal officer, could remove the independent counsel, an inferior officer, only “for good cause.”409 The Court examined
whether the good cause limitation on the Attorney General’s power to
remove independent counsel, by itself, violated separation of powers and
whether the act as a whole “impermissibly interfere[d]” with the President’s ability to faithfully execute the law.410
Under Perkins, when Congress vests the appointment of an officer in
someone other than the President, Congress can expressly limit the removal of that officer.411 Because Congress vested appointment authority
in the Attorney General, the good cause limitation was constitutional
under Perkins. Relegating Perkins to a “see also” footnote,412 the Court
turned instead to its holdings in Bowsher, Myers, Humphrey’s Executor,
and Wiener.413 The Court noted that Humphrey’s Executor was clear that
the Constitution did not give the President “‘illimitable power of removal’” over all executive officers.414 And the Court stressed that
“[u]nlike both Bowsher and Myers, [Morrison did] not involve an attempt
by Congress itself to gain a role in the removal of executive officials other
than its established powers of impeachment and conviction.”415
The Court acknowledged that the independent counsel performed a
“core executive function[ ].” 416 The Myers/Humphrey’s distinction would
thus suggest that the removal provision was unconstitutional. Rejecting
the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction as determinative for inferior officers,
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–91 (1988).
Id. at 659 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 et seq. (Supp. V 1982)).
Id. at 660 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (Supp. V 1982)).
Id. at 663 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (Supp. V 1982)).
Id. at 685.
See supra text accompanying notes 325–327.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689, n.27.
Id. at 685–88.
Id. at 687 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
Id. at 686.
Id. at 669.
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the Court stated, “the determination of whether the Constitution allows
Congress to impose a ‘good cause’-type restriction on the President’s
power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether or not
that official is classified as ‘purely executive.’”417 While the type of functions an officer performs was relevant to the analysis,418 the Court concluded that the more important question was whether the removal
restriction “impede[d] the President’s ability to perform his constitutional
duty [to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed].”419
The Court then turned to the question of whether the Act interfered
with the President’s ability to take care that the laws be faithfully executed under Article II.420 You will recall that the Court in Myers had
reasoned that limits on the President’s ability to remove an officer, especially an executive officer, interfered with his ability to faithfully execute
the laws.421 In other words, executive removal provisions are prima facie
evidence that the President is unable to fulfill his constitutional obligations. In Morrison, the Court rejected this prima facie approach and analyzed whether the President’s ability to faithfully execute the law actually
was impeded.422 Rejecting the conclusion that the President’s ability to
faithfully execute the law actually was impeded under this statute, the
Court reasoned that the independent counsel (1) was an inferior officer,
(2) had limited jurisdiction, (3) did not have tenure, (4) lacked policymaking power, and (5) did not have significant administrative authority.423 Moreover, the Court noted that the President retained the ability
to remove the attorney general without cause even if he could not remove the independent counsel.424 Hence, the good cause limitation was a
reasonable restriction on the President’s removal authority.425
Because the inferior officers in Morrison were subject to only one level
of “for-cause” removal, this case left open the question of whether more
than one level of for-cause removal would be constitutional.426 In 2010,
the Supreme Court answered this question in the negative in Free Enter417. Id. at 689.
418. Id. at 691.
419. Id. The Court said:
[O]ur present considered view is that the determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a “good cause”-type restriction on the
President’s power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether
or not that official is classified as “purely executive.” The analysis contained
in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the President, but to ensure
that Congress does not interfere with the President’s exercise of the “executive power” and his constitutionally appointed duty to “take care that the
laws be faithfully executed” under Article II.
Id. at 689–90 (footnotes omitted).
420. Id. at 693.
421. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926).
422. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90.
423. Id. at 691–92.
424. Id. at 692 (observing that the President retains “ample authority” by being able to
remove the Attorney General at-will).
425. Id. at 689.
426. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 495 (2010).
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prise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.427 The Court
framed the issue as whether “the President [may] be restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability to
remove an inferior officer, even though that inferior officer determines
the policy and enforces the laws of the United States?”428 The answer,
the Court held, was no.429 Dual for-cause removal provisions are contrary
to Article II’s “vesting of the executive power in the President” since
“[t]he President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if
he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”430
The Court in Free Enterprise examined the validity of a for-cause removal provision in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act).431 With the
Act, Congress created a private, non-profit corporation,432 the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (Board), “[a]fter a series of celebrated accounting debacles.”433 Congress sought to tighten regulation of
the accounting industry to prevent any further such debacles.434 Pursuant
to the Act, the SEC appoints five members to the Board for staggered
five-year terms435 and oversees their functions, “particularly with respect
to the issuance of rules or the imposition of sanctions (both of which are
subject to Commission approval and alteration).”436 The Act provided
that the SEC Commissioners could remove individual members of the
Board “only ‘for good cause shown.’”437 The plaintiff, a non-profit entity
representing accounting firms, sued, claiming, among other things, that
the dual for-cause removal provisions violated separation of powers in
light of the Board’s “wide-ranging executive power.”438
Under Perkins and Morrison, a single for-cause removal provision on
inferior officers who lack policy-making power and do not exercise significant administrative authority is constitutional.439 So long as the President
retains unfettered power to remove the principal officers (here the SEC
Commissioners), the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws is
not unconstitutionally impeded. However, the parties had stipulated that
the SEC Commissioners themselves were also removable only for
427. Id. at 483–84.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 484.
430. Id.
431. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
432. According to the statute, Board members are not Government “officer[s] or employee[s].” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484
(2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), (b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). Although the Board
members are not Government officials for statutory purposes, the Board is “part of the
Government” for constitutional purposes. Id. at 485–86.
433. Id. at 484.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 486 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7217(b)–(c) (2006)).
437. Id.
438. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
439. Id. at 494–95, 508 (noting that “restricting certain officers to a single level of insulation from the President . . . would have no effect, absent a congressional determination to
the contrary, on the validity of any officer’s continuance in office”).
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cause.440
Notably, this stipulation may be wrong. There is no statute limiting the
SEC Commissioners’ removal, as there was in Humphrey’s Executor,
likely because the statute establishing the SEC was enacted at a time
when Congress assumed that for-cause removal provisions would violate
the Constitution.441 Without an explicit removal limitation in the statute,
possibly a president would have the ability to remove a Commissioner for
any reason because under Hennen and Parsons removal provisions are
generally not implied.442 Because the parties stipulated that the SEC
Commissioners were only removable for cause, however, the Court presumed that the members of the Board had dual for-cause removal protection; these inferior officers could only be removed for cause by principal
officers who also could only be removed for cause.443 In dissent, Justice
Breyer noted that whether the SEC Commissioners have tenure protection was such a critical finding to the majority’s holding that it should not
have been based on the parties’ stipulation.444
Although the majority should not have accepted the stipulation, the
second for-cause level of protection proved to be the Act’s undoing. In
finding that dual for-cause removal protections impeded the President’s
ability to faithfully execute the laws, the majority returned to the Myers/
Humphrey’s distinction it had recently rejected in Morrison.445 The Court
noted that “the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those
who execute the laws” is a quintessential executive act.446 Myers, the majority noted, reaffirmed the principle that the President must have some
power to remove those officers for whom he is responsible.447 Pointing to
Humphrey’s Executor, the majority noted that Congress could confer
good-cause tenure on officers who acted in a “quasi-legislative and quasijudicial” capacity, rather than in a “purely executive” capacity.448 But
here, the majority concluded, the Board members exercised executive
power.449
440. Id. at 487 (“The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the Humphrey’s Executor standard of ‘inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’”) (citation omitted). One wonders why the Court
did not apply the constitutional avoidance doctrine and interpret the statute to not include
for-cause removal, thereby avoiding the removal question. It appears that the majority
was set on reviewing the constitutionality of this very powerful board.
441. See id.; see also id. at 518 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
442. But see Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the President’s power to remove a War Claims Commissioner was impliedly limited even though
the statute was silent regarding removal).
443. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
444. Id. at 545–46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
445. See supra text accompanying footnotes 416–419.
446. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 480 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 486 (Joseph Hales
ed., 1834)).
447. Id. at 492–93.
448. Id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–29 (1935))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
449. Id. at 498.
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After resurrecting the defunct Myers/Humphrey’s distinction, the majority examined whether the Board members were principal or inferior
officers. The majority interpreted Humphrey’s Executor as holding that
Congress could confer good-cause tenure on quasi-legislative and quasijudicial principal officers.450 Notably, the majority explained, the Court in
“Humphrey’s Executor did not address the removal of inferior officers.”451 The majority pointed out that pursuant to the Constitution,
Congress can vest the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of
departments.452 When Congress does so, the majority continued, then the
department head—rather than the President—holds removal power, and
Congress can limit the department head’s removal power, under
Perkins.453
The majority then turned to Morrison which, you will recall, had rejected the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction for inferior officers.454 In Morrison, the Court examined factors to determine when removal provisions
would impede a President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws.455 Removal provisions do not impede a President’s power when the officer (1)
is inferior, (2) has limited jurisdiction, (3) does not have tenure, (4) lacks
policymaking power, and (5) lacks significant administrative authority.456
In other words, the less important the officer, the more likely that a removal limitation will be valid. Examining these factors, the Free Enterprise majority noted that the Board members were inferior officers; thus,
the first factor was met.457 However, the majority did not examine any of
the four remaining Morrison factors, at least not clearly.458
Instead, the Court focused on the ability of the President to supervise
and control the Board members in light of the multiple removal provisions.459 The majority noted that one level of for-cause removal on executive inferior officers would be constitutional because the President
retained the power to remove the principal officers if they failed to remove an incompetent inferior officer.460 However, the added layer of tenure protection in the case of the Board was problematic because the
President would be unable to remove either the incompetent Board
members or the SEC Commissioners who failed to remove the incompe450. Id. at 493 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–29).
451. Id. (emphasis added).
452. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493.
453. Id.; United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886).
454. See supra text accompanying footnotes 416–419.
455. Morrison v. Olson, 497 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988)
456. Id.
457. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 510.
458. The majority noted in a footnote that its option did not address ALJs specifically.
The majority distinguished ALJs from Board members because many ALJs “perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions . . . or possess purely recommendatory powers.” Id. at 507 n.10. The footnote suggests that Board members have
policymaking power, though the footnote is not clear on this point.
459. Id. at 495.
460. Id. at 495.
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tent Board members.461 The Court seemed particularly troubled because,
not only were there two levels of for-cause removal protection, but for
one of them, Congress had enacted “an unusually high standard that must
be met before Board members [could] be removed.”462 In sum, one forcause removal limitation on a purely executive inferior office is constitutional. More than one is not.
Then, as if foreshadowing the controversy regarding the SEC ALJs, the
Court questioned: if two levels of for-cause tenure protection were constitutional, “why not a third?”463 Where, the majority wondered, does the
Constitution draw the line?464 The majority criticized the potential “Matryoshka doll of tenure protections” that would “exercise[ ] power in the
people’s name” if multiple for-cause removal provisions were valid.465 In
sum, the majority concluded that dual for-cause tenure protections “subvert[ ] the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts. The
Act’s restrictions are incompatible with the Constitution’s separation of
powers.” 466 Minimizing the potential effects of its holding, the majority
simply severed “the unconstitutional tenure provisions . . . from the remainder of the statute.” 467
Justice Breyer dissented.468 He criticized the majority for “fail[ing] to
create a bright-line rule [which would cause] uncertainty about the scope
of its holding.”469 He worried that a broad application of Free Enterprise’s holding could dismantle the entire administrative state by putting
the “job security” of “thousands of high-level Government officials . . .
and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at risk.”470
He specifically cautioned that if all dual for-cause removal provisions violate the Constitution, then the removal of more than 1,584 ALJs in over
twenty-five agencies would be unconstitutional.471
The majority responded to Breyer’s concern by suggesting that it was
unlikely that its holding would apply to ALJs, because “unlike members
of the Board, many administrative law judges . . . perform adjudicative
rather than enforcement or policymaking functions or possess purely recommendatory powers.”472 Returning again to the Myers/Humphrey’s dis461. Id. at 496.
462. Id. at 503 (“A Board member cannot be removed except for willful violations of
the Act, Board rules, or the securities laws; willful abuse of authority; or unreasonable
failure to enforce compliance . . . .”). Id. at 505 (describing the Board’s for-cause standard
as “a sharply circumscribed definition” that requires “rigorous procedures that must be
followed prior to removal”).
463. Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 497.
464. See id.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 498.
467. Id. at 508.
468. Id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
469. Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 536.
470. Id. at 540–41.
471. Id. at 542–43.
472. Id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion).
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tinction, the majority said:
[O]ur holding also does not address that subset of independent
agency employees who serve as administrative law judges . . . .
Whether administrative law judges are necessarily “Officers of the
United States” is disputed. [See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).] And unlike members of the Board, many administrative
law judges of course perform adjudicative rather than enforcement
or policymaking functions . . . or possess purely recommendatory
powers. The Government below refused to identify either “civil service tenure-protected employees in independent agencies” or administrative law judges as “precedent for the PCAOB.473
The majority thus distinguished ALJs from the members of the Board
based on their quasi-judicial role and limited powers. It is unclear
whether Roberts was trying to apply the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction
(executive versus quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial), was referring to
some of the Morrison factors (lacking policymaking power and lacking
significant administrative authority), or was combining the two in a removal test mash-up. Regardless, he was incorrect. The members of the
Board performed adjudicative functions.474 Additionally, many ALJs
have more than recommendatory powers and have “important administrative duties beyond pure adjudication.”475 As noted earlier, ALJs affect
policy when they adjudicate, which is one reason why the DOJ had concluded that ALJs are inferior officers.476
Trying to make sense of this footnote, Professor Kevin Stack has suggested that Justice Roberts may have been trying to distinguish Board
members from ALJs by suggesting that Board members perform adjudicative functions as well as executive and legislative functions, while ALJs
perform only adjudicative functions.477 Possibly. But if so, Roberts expanded the Myer/Humphrey’s distinction to apply to removal limitations
placed on inferior officers (ALJs). If this was what Justice Roberts intended, then he has seemingly resurrected the formalistic Myers/
Humphrey’s distinction: if any officer performs purely adjudicative, as opposed to purely executive, functions, then additional removal insulation
does not violate separation of powers. None of the Supreme Court cases
that applied the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction up to that time had done
so in the case of an inferior officer. In any event, the Court’s response is
dicta at best and confusing at worst.
In sum, the Free Enterprise majority reasoned that dual for-cause removal provisions violate the Constitution precisely because the President
is unable to remove either an inferior officer who fails in her job or the
473. Id.
474. Id. at 531 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
475. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S.at 535.
476. See generally Sec’y of Educ. Review, supra note 247, at 14.
477. Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391,
2412, 2411 n.117 (2011).
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principal officers who oversee her.478 Rather, the President would have to
rely on both inferior and principal officers always acting lawfully, competently, and faithfully. Pursuant to Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor,
each layer of for-cause removal would have been constitutional by itself;
however, under Free Enterprise, when Congress combines the two layers
of for-cause removal, the dual layers become unconstitutional.479 As the
D.C. Circuit Court in Association of American Railroads v. U.S. Department of Transportation recently noted, “[J]ust because two structural features raise no constitutional concerns independently does not mean
Congress may combine them in a single statute.”480
2. A Removal Framework
The nine removal cases described provide conflicting guidance but offer the following removal framework. The Court applies a different test
depending on whether the removal limitations affect principal or inferior
officers. For principal officers, the Court crafted the Myers/Humphrey’s
distinction: a formalist test based on the type of acts the officer performed.481 Under the Myers/Humphrey’s distinction, Congress cannot
limit the President’s authority to remove purely executive officers.482
However, Congress can limit the President’s ability to remove quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative officers.483 The Court has never, however,
considered whether multiple levels of tenure protection for quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative principal officers would be constitutional.
And that issue does not arise in regard to the SEC ALJs, who are not
principal officers.
Instead, the issue that arises with SEC ALJs is whether multiple levels
of for-cause removal on inferior officers are constitutional. Recall that
removal limitations for inferior officers are not implied; that is the rule
from Hennen and Parsons.484 Next, Perkins tells us that Congress can
expressly limit the executive’s removal power when Congress vests appointment in an entity other than the President.485 But Myers and Bowsher caution that Congress can limit the removal power of that entity so
long as Congress does not keep for itself a role in the removal process
and so long as the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws is not
impeded.486
478. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 496.
479. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.R. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 673 (D. C. Cir.
2013) vacated on other grounds 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015), remanded to 821 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
480. Id. at 673.
481. See supra Part III.C.1.
482. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). Additionally, the Court
rejected Congress’s attempt to assume removal authority over executive officers. Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–27 (1986). But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988).
483. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958); Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32(1935).
484. See supra Part III.C.1.
485. See supra Part III.C.1.
486. Myers, 272 U.S. at 161; Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27, 733-34.
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One method the Court has used to determine whether a removal provision impedes the President’s ability to faithfully execute the laws is to
examine the Morrison factors: whether the officer (1) is inferior, (2) has
limited jurisdiction, (3) lacks tenure, (4) lacks policymaking power, and
(5) lacks significant administrative authority.487 The less significant the
official and her responsibilities, the more likely that the removal provision will be upheld. No one of these factors is determinative; rather, the
Court’s concern, as explained in Free Enterprise, is that the President’s
ability to execute the laws not be impeded.488 And the President’s ability
to execute the laws is impeded when there are multiple for-cause removal
provisions. The President must retain some ability to remove a recalcitrant inferior officer, whether the President has the power to remove that
inferior officer directly or the ability to remove the principal officer overseeing the recalcitrant.
3. The SEC ALJ Removal Provisions Violate Separation of Powers
Assuming the Supreme Court applies this removal framework to the
SEC ALJs, it should conclude that the SEC ALJ removal limitations violate separation of powers. As noted earlier, the SEC ALJs are inferior
officers, not employees, because they exercise significant authority and
decision-making power pursuant to the laws of the United States. 489
Because the SEC ALJs are inferior officers, the appropriate approach,
under Perkins, is for a court to ask first whether Congress vested appointment power in an entity other than the executive and, second, whether
Congress expressly limited that entity’s power to remove the inferior officer without taking on removal power for itself.490 For the SEC ALJs,
Congress vested their appointment in the OPM.491 Further, Congress
provided that the SEC, like all agency heads, may remove its ALJs only
for cause.492 Thus, Congress vested appointment authority in an entity
other than the President, limited the removal power of that entity, and
did so without retaining removal power for itself. So far, so good.
Next, under Morrison removal provisions on (1) inferior officers are
valid so long as the officer (2) has limited jurisdiction, (3) lacks tenure,
(4) lacks policymaking power, and (5) lacks significant administrative authority.493 And under Free Enterprise, in order to be valid, these express
removal provisions cannot actually interfere with the President’s ability
to faithfully execute the laws.
487. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92.
488. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010).
489. See supra Part III.A.3.
490. See supra Part III.C.1.
491. See Gray Complaint, supra note 99, at ¶ 52 (“SEC ALJs may be appointed by the
SEC’s Office of Administrative Law Judges, with input from the Chief Administrative Law
Judge, human resource functions and the Office of Personnel Management.”).
492. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
493. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92.

56

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

Here is where problems arise. A court examining the five factors identified in Morrison—whether the officer (1) is inferior, (2) has limited jurisdiction, (3) does not have tenure, (4) lacks policymaking power, and
(5) lacks significant administrative authority494—should find that the
SEC ALJs meet only two of them. The SEC ALJs are inferior officers,495
and they have somewhat limited jurisdiction, because they can adjudicate
only certain types of SEC cases.496 However, a court would likely find
that the SEC ALJs do not meet the other three factors. When the SEC
ALJs adjudicate cases, they inevitably make policy, albeit their policymaking authority may be more limited than purely executive officials. 497
Moreover, they hold significant adjudicatory authority (it is unclear
whether adjudicatory authority is the same as administrative authority;
Morrison did not define administrative authority)498 and have for-cause
tenure.499 Arguably, because the Morrison factors suggest that the SEC
ALJs are inferior officers with significant authority, the first level forcause protection provided to the SEC ALJs may well be unconstitutional.
This conclusion may seem unnecessarily formalist. A functionalist
would note that ALJs have served as the cornerstone of the administrative system for many years. The ALJ system has worked for years and
affects a huge number of litigants who interact with a huge number of
agencies. The implications of finding the current removal process for
ALJs to be unconstitutional are staggering. To take just one example, the
Social Security Administration (SSA) ALJs hear thousands of cases each
year dealing with social security benefits.500 To shut down the process
would have dramatic impact. In short, because ALJs have served important functions for so long, it may seem counterintuitive to find their appointment and removal process unconstitutional now.
Yet, this argument is classically functionalist: if the system is not broken
and has worked thus far, why fix it? A similar argument was raised in INS
v. Chadha, in which the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the
legislative veto.501 Justice White, in dissent, warned that without the legislative veto, Congress would have to “either [ ] refrain from delegating the
necessary authority . . . or . . . abdicate its law-making function to the
Executive Branch and independent agencies.”502 He worried that choosing the former would “leave[ ] major national problems unresolved”
494. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988).
495. See supra Part III.A.3.
496. See generally Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very
Loudly,” But What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124 YALE L.J. 209 (2014) (providing a list of enforcement actions that the SEC
brings).
497. Sec’y of Educ. Review, supra note 247, at 14.
498. See supra note 455 and accompanying text.
499. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
500. Social Security Disability Benefits: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec.
& Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Debra Bice, Chief Administrative Law
Judge, Social Security Administration) (discussing the hearings process).
501. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983).
502. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
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while choosing the latter would create the risk of “unaccountable policymaking” by those who were not elected to perform that function.503
Rejecting these concerns, the Supreme Court nevertheless found the
power arrangement unconstitutional.504 Despite Justice White’s fears, the
majority’s holding proved not to be “destructive,” nor did it cause the
administrative world to fall apart.505 Similarly, here, the longstanding nature of the ALJs’ multiple for-cause removal procedures alone cannot be
the basis for finding an unconstitutional removal process constitutional.
Disrupting a system that is largely working should factor into the solution, but should not be determinative as to whether that system violates
the Constitution.
Additionally, quasi-adjudicators, like the SEC ALJs, are arguably protected from executive removal for good reason: to promote ALJ independence. Before the APA was enacted, there was considerable concern that
hearing examiners could not exercise independent judgment both because they were required to perform prosecutorial and investigative functions in addition to their judicial work506 and because they were
subordinate to the agency heads.507 So, Congress included within the
APA a number of provisions to help ensure the independence of these
hearing examiners, later ALJs. For example, when conducting a hearing,
an ALJ cannot be “responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction” of employees or agents who perform investigative or prosecutorial
functions for the agency.508 Nor may an ALJ “consult [any] person or
party,” including other agency officials, concerning a “fact at issue” in the
hearing, “unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.”509 Moreover, and at issue here, ALJs can be removed only for
good cause established and determined by the MSPB after a formal adjudication.510 Finally, Congress ensured that ALJ compensation is also free
from executive control.511 In sum, Congress rightly concluded that effective adjudication requires that litigants believe the process to be fair and
the decision-maker to be impartial.512 ALJs must be free to adjudicate
without threat of retaliation.513 Protecting ALJs from arbitrary and retali503. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
504. Id. at 955–58 (majority opinion).
505. Id. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting).
506. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36–41 (1950).
507. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (citing Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial
Exam’rs Conference, 345 U. S. 128, 131 (1953)).
508. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2012).
509. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (2012).
510. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
511. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2012); 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2012).
512. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (stating that biased decision-making is
“constitutionally unacceptable,”, especially in a system that “endeavor[s] to prevent even
the probability of unfairness”); Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008).
After all, due process “demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial
or quasi-judicial capacities.” Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242–43, 243 n.2 (1980)).
513. A former ALJ alleged she felt pressured to rule in favor of the SEC and that she
was told to work under the presumption that the defendants were guilty until proven inno-

58

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

atory removal promotes independence and impartiality.514 Moreover,
agencies can review de novo the ALJ decision and reverse it if they disagree. Hence, again from a functionalist standpoint, this one level of removal protection may not only be constitutional but welcomed. Justice
Breyer certainly seemed to think so.515
Nevertheless, even if the initial for-cause layer of removal protection is
constitutional, it is very unlikely that the second for-cause layer is constitutional under Free Enterprise. Focusing on the two for-cause layers, the
Court in Free Enterprise examined whether multiple removal provisions
actually impeded the President’s ability to supervise and control the
Board members.516 What was particularly problematic to the majority in
Free Enterprise was the second for-cause removal layer; this layer prevented the President from removing the overseeing principal officer of an
underperforming inferior officer. In short, the President could exercise
neither direct nor indirect control over an underperforming inferior
officer.
Like the Board members in Free Enterprise, the SEC ALJs are protected by a second, and possibly a third, level of removal protection. First,
all ALJs, including the SEC ALJs, are protected by statute from removal
absent good cause.517 Second, to remove an SEC ALJ, the SEC Commissioners must first bring a good-cause formal proceeding before the
MSPB.518 However, these SEC Commissioners may themselves be protected from removal absent “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office.”519 Third, members of the MSPB, who determine whether sufficient “good cause” exists to remove an SEC ALJ, are also protected from
removal.520 In sum, for an incompetent SEC ALJ to be removed, first the
SEC Commissioners must refer the ALJ to the MSPB and establish
cause, then the MSPB must agree that cause existed. Hence, presumably
three levels of for-cause removal are present.
Assuming the above analysis is correct, the world of ALJs, and the
SEC ALJs specifically, must change. If the SEC ALJs’ removal provisions violate separation of powers, then likely all ALJs’ removal provicent. Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 [https://perma
.cc/J3X2-TS7X].
514. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (considering whether agency employees had immunity from prosecution for allegedly ultra vires acts).
515. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 522 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
516. Id. at 495–96 (majority opinion); but see Zaring, supra note 108, at 1191–95 (arguing that whatever the doctrinal problems with removal, ALJs are too traditional to find
unconstitutional now).
517. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012).
518. Id. While other civil servants also receive hearings before dismissal, only the ALJs
receive formal hearings. See 5 U.S.C. § 4303(b)(1) (2012).
519. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted);
MFS Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 380 F.3d 611, 619–20 (2d Cir. 2004).
520. They are removable “by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.” 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (2012).
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sions violate separation of powers. In Free Enterprise, the majority
remedied the constitutional infirmity simply by severing the unconstitutional language.521 Severing the unconstitutional for-cause removal provisions for the SEC ALJs will not be so simple. The statute that includes
the first level of for-cause removal protection applies to all ALJs, not just
the SEC ALJs.522 If all dual for-cause removal provisions violate the
Constitution, then the removal of more than 1,584 ALJs in over twentyfive agencies would be unconstitutional.523 In short, the potential repercussions of finding the ALJs’ for-cause removal provision to be unconstitutional are significantly greater than were the repercussions for
invalidating a removal provision that applied to a Board with just five
members.
However, there is an additional concern in the case of the SEC ALJs
specifically. The members of the MPRB and the SEC Commissioners also
have for-cause tenure.524 Severing the SEC ALJ for-cause removal limitation addresses only one of these potentially problematic, multiple forcause tenure protections. The Court would still need to evaluate the intersection of these two remaining for-cause removal provisions to ensure
the two acting in concert do not impede the President’s ability to faithfully execute the law.
Justice Breyer expressed concern about the dismantling of the ALJ system in his dissent in Free Enterprise.525 Broad application of Free Enterprise’s holding, he warned, could dismantle the entire administrative state
by putting the job security of “thousands of high-level Government officials . . . and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at
risk.”526 For Justice Breyer, multiple levels of removal protection serve a
legitimate role in protecting the integrity of agency adjudications and
should be upheld.527 And the majority appeared to concede as much in
footnote ten when it responded to Justice Breyer’s concern.528
However, if Justice Breyer is right, then Free Enterprise is meaningless;
its holding would apply only to those cases in which Congress creates an
agency within an independent agency and tenure protects both levels.529
To our knowledge, Congress has created this unusual agency structure
only once in our Nation’s history, and it is unlikely to do so again. Indeed,
ALJs seem quite different from the PCAOB members. We cannot imag521. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509.
522. Id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
523. Id. at 542–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
524. Id. at 487 (majority opinion) (“The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot
themselves be removed by the President except under the Humphrey’s Executor standard
of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’”).
525. Id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
526. Id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
527. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
528. Id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion).
529. Recently, the D.C. Circuit cited Free Enterprise to support its holding that it was
unconstitutional for the CFPB to be headed by a single director whom the President could
not remove except for cause. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (reh’g granted Feb. 16, 2017).
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ine that the Supreme Court intended to issue such a narrow opinion.530
However, the composition of the Supreme Court has changed with the
passing of Justice Antonin Scalia. The conservative majority that decided
Free Enterprise is no more, although given the conservative make-up of
both the executive and legislature, a similar-thinking replacement is
likely. Very likely, resolution of this important issue hinges on the identity
of the next President and that leader’s appointment to the Supreme
Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The SEC ALJs current structure likely violates the Constitution in two
ways. First, as inferior officers, the SEC ALJs must be appointed by the
President, courts of law, or a department. However, the SEC ALJs are
appointed by the OPM and the SEC Chief ALJ. This appointment process violates the Constitution. How the SEC will remedy this constitutional infirmity is not clear. Perhaps the Commissioners will simply
appoint the already-serving SEC ALJs to their current positions, as the
DOT did after Weiss v. United States.531 Regardless of whether such a
retroactive process would allow for meaningful appointment as the Constitution contemplates, there is a more fundamental concern. What about
the validity of the pending and issued SEC ALJ orders?532 The effects
from Noel Canning533 suggest that such an approach may have a staggering impact.534
Second, as inferior officers, the SEC ALJs cannot be subject to multiple levels of for-cause removal protection without violating separation of
powers. And unlike the statute at issue in Free Enterprise, severing the
unconstitutional provision will not be an easy fix. The statute that includes the first level of for-cause removal protection applies to more than
530. In any event, at least one court has agreed with Justice Breyer. The United States
District Court for Southern District of New York in Duka v. SEC, suggested that the SEC
ALJ’s dual for-cause removal protections are likely constitutional. 103 F. Supp. 3d 382,
393–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) . The court issued its ruling in response to a motion for a preliminary injunction, so the court’s analysis is preliminary and short on explanation. In its reasoning, the court returned to the Myers/Humphrey Executor’s distinction. Id. at 394. The
court noted that limiting the removal of “‘quasi-judicial’ agency adjudicators [is] unlikely
to interfere with the President’s ability to perform his executive duties.” Id. at 395. Because
the Duka court applied the principal officer framework rather than the inferior officer
framework—specifically finding the SEC ALJs’ quasi-adjudicatory nature to be determinative—the court’s conclusion lacks persuasiveness. Additionally, the United States District
Court for Northern District of Georgia noted that because ALJs “likely occupy ‘quasijudicial’ or ‘adjudicatory’ positions,” it had “serious doubts” that the two-layer protections
are unconstitutional. See Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 132082, at *35 n.10 (N.D. Ga. Aug 4, 2015); Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166
F. 3d 1335, 1354 n.10 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015), vacated and remanded, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d
1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2015),
vacated and remanded 825 F.3d 1236, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016).
531. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 654 (1997) (discussing Weiss v. United
States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994)).
532. See supra Part III.B.2.
533. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
534. See supra Part III.B.2.
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1,500 ALJs in twenty-five different agencies, not just to the SEC ALJs.
Hence, the repercussions of such a holding would be significantly greater
than were the repercussions for invalidating a removal provision that applied to a Board with just five members. Moreover, severing the SEC
ALJ for-cause removal limitation addresses only one problematic forcause layer. Two more would remain.
Hence, the constitutional challenges raised in these cases are far from
inconsequential. Thousands of ALJs may be subject to unconstitutional
appointment and removal provisions. And there is no easy fix. The
shadow of Free Enterprise looms large.

